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DeBoer: Equality as a Fundamental Value in the Indiana Constitution

EQUALITY AS A FUNDAMENTAL VALUE IN
THE INDIANA CONSTITUTION
Michael John DeBoer*
Whatever the objections of the common law of England,
there is a law higher in this country, and better suited to the
rights and liberties of American citizens, - that law which
accords to every citizen the natural right to gain a livelihood
by intelligence, honesty, and industry in the arts, the sciences,
the professions, or other vocations....

As was said by the supreme court of the United States
"The theory upon which our political institutions rest is
that all men have certain inalienable rights; that among these
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that in the
pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions,
are alike open to every one, and that in the protection of these
rights all are equal before the law."
Before the law this right to a choice of avocations cannot
be said to be denied, or intended to be abridged, on account of
sex. Certainly the framers of our constitution intended no
such result, and surely the legislature entertained no such
purpose. Instead of such results having been intended in this
state, we find the constitution declaring that such rights are
inalienable.
Bearing in mind these inalienablerights, it is not possible
for us to believe that the constitution was adopted, and the
legislation enacted, in reliance upon any supposed rule of the
common law which would exclude women from the enjoyment
of any of such rights. We cannot believe that the law of this
state was intended, by fixing the qualification for legitimate
avocations of one class of citizens, to entirely exclude another
class.
- Justice Hackney, In re Leach (1893)1

J.D. (1998); M.Div. (1995); M.A.R. (1993); B.A. (1992). The author practices law in
Colorado with Rothgerber, Johnson & Lyons LLP, but served as a law clerk for Justice
Brent E. Dickson of the Indiana Supreme Court and taught Indiana Constitutional Law at
Valparaiso University School of Law.
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Our law is no respecter of persons. The rights of just and
upright citizens are not more sacred in the eyes of the law than
the rights of the poorest and meanest citizens of the state. The
safeguards erected by the Constitution are intended to protect
the rights of all citizens alike. They protect the rights of the
guilty as well as those of the innocent. The court cannot give
its sanction to the conviction of any person accused of crime
where the proccedings on which the judgment is based show
the denial of a right to which the defendant was entitled under
the Constitution. Such judicial sanction, in any case, would
destroy the efficacy of the constitutionalsafeguards to protect
the rights of all citizens of the state.
- Justice Lairy, Batchelor v. State (1919)2
I.

INTRODUCTION

Undergirding the framework of state and federal constitutions are
certain values, principles, and judgments so basic to the systems of law
and government thereby constituted and the societies thereupon
established that they may well be called fundamental. Among these are
government by the people, individual freedom and liberty, the due
process or course of law, justice and fairness, the dignity of every
individual, and the essential equality of all human beings before the
Together, these values, principles, and judgments have a
law. 3
constitutive function in American systems of law and government.
Although these values, principles, and judgments have a long
history that antedates state and federal constitutions, they have been
recognized, indeed memorialized, in these documents. And today,
decades and even centuries later, in contexts very different from those
existing at the time of drafting, courts are looking to these age-old
values, principles, and judgments to define the limits of governmental

In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 669, 34 N.E. 641, 642 (1893) (quoting Cumming v. Missouri,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 321 (1866)); see IND. CONST. art. I, § 1 (recognizing the right of women
in Indiana to practice law).
2
Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 84, 125 N.E. 773, 778 (1920).
3
Indeed, the legitimacy, stability, and integrity of systems of law and government are
measured according to how these basic values, ideals, and judgments are recognized and
preserved.
1
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power, to safeguard the basic rights of every individual, and to guide the
4
resolution of disputes.
Although these values, principles, and judgments might be studied
in relation to each other and throughout the legal and governmental
systems in the United States of America, this Article separately examines
equality as a fundamental value in the system of law and government
established by the 1851 Constitution of the State of Indiana.5 This Article

4

Half a century ago, the Indiana Supreme Court recognized this reality:
The preserving of the constitutional framework of our
government against encroachment by one branch upon another is one
of the prime responsibilities of our courts. Within and dependent
upon this structure of constitutional government, our people are
blessed by a galaxy of rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed to
us by constitutional declaration. These have been amplified by a
labyrinth of executive rules and regulations, legislative enactments and
judicial declarations which our courts are, by inherent authority and
constitutional mandate, required to preserve, construe, apply and
enforce ....
... Our courts are the bulwark, the final authority which
guarantees to every individual his right to breathe free, to prosper and
be secure within the framework of a constitutional government. The
arm which holds the scales of justice cannot be shackled or made
impotent by either restraint, circumvention or denial by another
branch of that government....

Courts are an integral part of the government, and entirely
independent; deriving their powers directly from the Constitution, in
so far as such powers are not inherent in the very nature of the
judiciary. A court of general jurisdiction, whether named in the
Constitution or established in pursuance of the provisions of the
Constitution, cannot be directed, controlled, or impeded in its
functions by any of the other departments of the government. The
security of human rights and safety of free institutions require the
absolute integrity and freedom of action of courts.
Noble County Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 181-83, 125 N.E.2d 709, 713-15 (Ind.
1955) (quoting Board of Com'rs of Elkhart County v. Albright, 168 Ind. 564, 578, 81 N.E.
578, 582-83 (1907)).
5
Equality may be described in a variety of ways -as a principle, an idea, a belief, an
ideal, a right, a convention, and so on. The author will refer to equality as a value, indeed
as a fundamental value. Although each of these descriptions contributes to a fuller
understanding of equality, conceiving of equality as a value suggests that equality is an
element that permeates our law and systems of government. Equality is a factor that is
esteemed by the people in those systems, a standard that assists in judging the justness of
the law and government conduct, and a quality that is aspirational, instructive, and
transcendent. As a value, equality calls for continual reassessment and reformation and for
consistency between what is believed and what is done. Remaining over time, it leads
citizens and their governments to conceive of better societies and to work to create them.
Furthermore, understanding equality as a value may help to explain how people can

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 [2004], Art. 8

492

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW

[Vol.38

will argue that the framers of the Indiana Constitution understood
equality to be a fundamental value and recognized it as such in the
In examining equality in the Indiana
drafting of the document.
Constitution of 1851, this Article explores the framers' and the ratifiers'
understanding of equality, their perspective on its role in law and
government, the manner in which this value informed their work, and
their attempt to safeguard equality both explicitly and implicitly in the
constitution. This Article, however, looks beyond the text and context of
the framers and ratifiers and considers several recent decisions by the
Supreme Court of Indiana that have discussed equality or touched upon
6
equality principles.
In developing this theme, this study of equality in the Indiana
Constitution will proceed in three steps. First, this Article will explore
some of the currents that came together to shape the framers' and
ratifiers' understanding of equality and ultimately the constitutional text
they adopted. Second, this Article will study specific provisions within
the Indiana Constitution that establish equality as a fundamental value
and note some exceptions and inconsistencies inherent within the text.
Third, this Article will consider several recent decisions by the Supreme
Court of Indiana, observing the implications of these decisions for
equality in Indiana.
II.

EQUALITY IN AMERICAN AND INDIANA HISTORY

The conceptions of equality held by the framers and ratifiers of the
1851 Indiana Constitution were influenced by the dominant currents in
mid-nineteenth century America and Indiana as well as many of the
same currents that flowed during the American Revolutionary era, that
shaped the establishment of the new nation, the content of the United
States Constitution, and the contours of American law, and that fueled
the westward expansion of American boundaries and institutions. 7 A

advance the value in one context, when they themselves are involved, yet compromise and
act inconsistently in another context.

This Article does not engage in contemporary debates regarding equality or the extent
to which the government must play a role in equalizing society in economic terms and
ensuring equality of opportunity and outcome. Rather, this Article focuses upon equality
as it was understood by the framers, as set forth in the Indiana Constitution, and as
interpreted by the courts.
7
For general surveys of currents in American legal and political experience that shaped
notions of equality, see J. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 38-56 (1983); Patrick
McKinley Brennan, Arguing for Human Equality, 18 J.L. & RELIGION 99 (2002); George P.
Fletcher, In God's Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under Law, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
6
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survey of these currents shows that Indiana in the late eighteenth and
first half of the nineteenth centuries experienced a confluence of various
equalitarian currents, ranging from the religious and philosophical to the
legal and political. Although some of these currents originated in then
contemporary movements that were altering the American landscape,
others originated in ancient sources that influenced the trajectory of
8
Western civilization and the development of the Western legal tradition.
The architects of American legal and political systems drew upon
traditions and ideas that had been cultivated in the Western world over
centuries. 9 The natural law tradition is one such tradition, 10 a tradition
grounded in Greek and Roman philosophy and Christian theology."
This tradition has left an indelible imprint on the Western legal tradition
2
and permeated the thought of the founders of America and Indiana.1
Although the natural law tradition has developed and changed over
time, in the Western legal tradition it has been generally understood to
teach that God the Creator has infused certain, fixed laws within nature
and implanted them within the human mind and conscience. 13 Under

1608 (1999); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 254-60 (1983); Jane
Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment
DiscriminationLaws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1060-76 (1996).
8
This Article will not undertake a comprehensive study of these currents and their
sources, but will present some of these currents in broad terms and focus upon the
confluence of these currents in Indiana during the first half of the nineteenth century.
9

JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & JACK WALTER PELTASON, GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE:

THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 65 (2d ed. 1954) (arguing that the

traditions and ideas "were part of the intellectual luggage that the colonists had brought
with them, or later imported, from the Old World").
10 For general background material on the natural law tradition, see Brian Bix, Natural
Law Theory, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 223-40 (1996); J.
BUDZISZEWSKI, WRITTEN ON THE HEART: THE CASE FOR NATURAL LAW (1997); JOHN FINNIS,

NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY
ESSAYS (Robert P. George ed., 1992); ORIGINS OF THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION (Arthur L.
Harding ed., 1954); BERYL HAROLD LEVY, ANGLO-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ITS DEVELOPMENT AND OUTCOME 3-15 (1991).
11 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 12 (1983).

12 BERMAN, supra note 11, at 28 (noting that, even in the eleventh century, principles
derived from the divine and natural law were used to judge emperors, kings, and lords);
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, 4 (1977) (noting
the prevalence, at the time of the founding of America, of the understanding that the
common law was based upon the law of nature and its author).
13

JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING

FATHERS 40-41 (1987); BURNS & PELTASON, supra note 9, at 65 (stating that in this tradition
"the natural law [are] known to all men through the use of reason and [are] binding on all,"
and "the laws of nature a[re] inherent, inescapable rules of human behavior-laws, in

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 [2004], Art. 8

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

494

[Vol. 38

this tradition, human law is ultimately derived from and to be tested by
reason and conscience.14
John Locke propounded a secularized version of this tradition:
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it,
which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that
Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that
being all equal and independent, no one out to harm
5
another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possession.
Sir William Blackstone later reflected this tradition in commenting
on the laws of England:
This will of his Maker is called the law of nature.
For as God, when He created matter, and endued it with
a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the
perpetual direction of that motion; so, when He created
man, and endued him with free will to conduct himself
in all parts of life, He laid down certain immutable laws
of human nature, whereby that free will is in some
degree regulated and restrained and gave him also the
faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws.
Considering the Creator only a Being of infinite
power, He was able unquestionably to have prescribed
whatever laws He pleased to His creature, man,
however unjust or severe. But as He is also a Being of
infinite wisdom, He has laid down only such laws as
were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in
the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept.
These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil,
to which the Creator Himself in all his Dispensations
conforms; and which He has enabled human reason to
discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of
human actions.
Such, among others, are these
principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt

Cicero's words, that are in accordance with nature, apply to all men, and are unchangeable
and eternal").
14
15

BERMAN, supra note 11, at 12.
JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 289 (1698) (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.

1967).
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nobody, and should render to everyone his due; to
which three general precepts Justinian has reduced the
whole doctrine of law....
This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and
dictated by God Himself, is of course superior in
obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in
all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any
validity, if contrary to this: and such of them as are
valid derive all of their force, and all of their authority;
16
mediately or immediately, from this original.
The British colonies in America inherited this tradition. Thus, nearly
fifty years before the Revolution, it was declared that "the Common
Law, takes in the Law of Nature, the Law of Reason and the revealed
Law of God; which are equally binding, at All times, in All Places, and to
All Persons."'17 During America's founding era, Christian and deist
thinkers could agree that the liberties and rights enjoyed by the people
were based upon a "higher law" ordained by God that embodied
"natural rights," which were discoverable in nature and history. 18
According to the natural law, the essential natural, inalienable rights of
humans include life, liberty, and property.1 9 John Dickinson, one
American founding father, reflected this sentiment when he wrote that
rights "are born with us; exist with us; and cannot be taken away from
us by any human power." 2° It is worthy to note that the phrase "due
process of law" is a fourteenth century English phrase meaning natural
law, and thus the framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution wrote the natural law tradition into
21
America's fundamental law.
Another set of ideas that molded thought in the founding era was
the social compact (or contract) theory, which was particularly

16

SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book I, Part I §

II.
17

HORWITZ,

supra note

12, at 7 (quoting DANIEL DULANY, THE RIGHTS OF THE

INHABITANTS OF MARYLAND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ENGLISH LAWS (1728), in ST. G.
SIOUSSAT, THE ENGLISH STATUTES IN MARYLAND 82 (1903)).
18
JAMES Q. WILSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 16 (1992); EIDSMOE, supranote 13, at 40-41.
19
20

BURNS & PELTASON, supra note 9, at 65.
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 77 (1967)

(quoting John Dickinson).
21

BERMAN, supranote 11, at 12.
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influential in America in the 1700s and early 1800s. 22 This theory has
roots in early Jewish thought and covenant theology and expanded and
disseminated through the work of the religious descendants of the
sixteenth century Swiss reformer John Calvin, including the Pilgrims,
Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and other groups that dominated the
colonial and early American landscape and dramatically influenced the
development of American political and legal structures. 23 The social
contract theory in this theological tradition taught that rulers derive their
authority from God, but that God gives this authority to rulers through
the people.24

22
23

LEVY, supra note 10, at 12.
For a comprehensive overview of the covenant tradition from Jewish foundation to

modem realities, see DANIEL J. ELAZAR, COVENANT AND POLITY IN BIBLICAL ISRAEL:
BIBLICAL FOUNDATIONS AND JEWISH EXPRESSIONS (Covenant Tradition in Politics, Vol. 1)
(1995) [hereinafter ELAZAR, COVENANT AND POLITY]; DANIEL J. ELAZAR, COVENANT AND
COMMONWEALTH: FROM CHRISTIAN SEPARATION THROUGH THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION

(Covenant Tradition in Politics, Vol. 2) (1996) [hereinafter ELAZAR, COVENANT AND
COMMONWEALTH]; DANIEL J. ELAZAR, COVENANT AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE GREAT
FRONTIER AND THE MATRIX OF FEDERAL DEMOCRACY (Covenant Tradition in Politics, Vol. 3)
(1998) [hereinafter ELAZAR, COVENANT AND CONSTITUTIONALISM]; COVENANT AND CIVIL
SOCrETY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL MATRIX OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Covenant Tradition in

Politics, Vol. 4) (1998); see also Michael J. DeBoer, Book Reviews, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 805-11
(2001) (reviewing Professor Elazar's four-volume series). Professor Elazar has convincingly
argued that covenants are grounded in clear and binding relationships, building upon
basic notions regarding partnership and equality. In interpreting the covenant tradition,
Elazar explained that a covenant involved the coming together of "basically equal humans
who consent with one Jan]other through a moral binding pact supported by a transcendent
power, establishing with the partners a new framework or setting them on the road to a
new task that can only be dissolved by mutual agreement of all the parties to it." ELAZAR,
COVENANT AND POLITY, supra, at 1. Recognizing that relationships are central to the
concept of covenant, covenants establish lines of authority, distributions of power, bodies
politic, and systems of law, and thus the covenant tradition provided a solid foundation
upon which to build notions of federalism, the concept of power being located in the
people, and the distributing and sharing of power. The covenant tradition grew from
ancient biblical sources in the Jewish tradition, and was revived and adapted during and
after the Protestant Reformation by theologians and thinkers in the Reformed tradition. See
generally ELAZAR, COVENANT AND COMMONWEALTH, supra. In America, the covenant
tradition evolved such that the notion of the covenant commonwealth joined with the
notion of a civil society organized around a political covenant (compact or contract) and
governed by written constitutions to which the people consent. See generally ELAZAR,
COVENANT AND CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra. Strands of this tradition are found in the
writings and thought of philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, and John
Locke and among the descendants of the Reformed Protestant tradition (including the
Pilgrims, the Puritans, the Congregationalists, the Dutch Calvinists, and the Scottish
Presbyterians). See generally id.
24 EIDSMOE, supranote 13, at 24 (citing SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, LEx, REX, OR THE LAW AND
THE PRINCE 1, 6-7 (1644) (reprinted 1982)).
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John Locke articulated a more secular version of the social compact
theory, according to which humans in a state of nature form a
government by mutual consent and give it the limited authority to act in
order to protect and support inalienable rights, such as life, liberty,
health, and property. 25 The social compact theory, according to Locke,
would not allow the legislature to assume a power to rule arbitrarily;
rather it would require the legislature to dispense justice and decide the
rights of the subjects by promulgating standing laws that established one
rule that would apply for the rich and the poor, for the elites and the
commoners. 26 Thus, Locke foreshadowed "some of most fundamental
propositions of American constitutional law: Law must be general; it
must afford equal protection to all; it may not validly operate
retroactively; it must be enforced through the courts -legislative power
27
does not include judicial power."
Under the social compact theory, the people, not kings or aristocrats,
would reign, and those doctrines used to keep the people subject and to
shelter kings and aristocrats in a harbor of privileges, rights, and
prerogatives would lose their force and effect. The beliefs that the
monarchy was a divinely ordained institution and that station and
heredity entitled persons to respect and privilege yielded to beliefs that
the only moral foundation of legitimate government is the consent of the
governed and that God had created all people with certain rights,
including the right to choose their form of government and to alter their
government.28 Thus, the framers of the United States Constitution
would proclaim, audaciously at the time, that "We the People of the
United States... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
29
States of America."
Although the architects of the American republic drew upon ancient
wisdom and blended in the Enlightenment outlook on reality, the
American Revolution was a political and ideological revolution that
came about by and indeed brought about a "radical change in the

2

Id. at 24-25, 62.

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. 11, para. 36 (Everyman's ed.
1924). In 1647, this essential sentiment was expressed as follows: "the poorest he that is in
England has a life to live as the richest he." Colonel Thomas Rainboro, "Debates on the
Putney Project,1647," quoted in A. T. MASON, FREE GOVERNMENT INTHE MAKING 12 (1949).
27 Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (Pt. 2), 42 HARV.
L. REV. 365, 390 (1929)
28
WILSON, supra note 18, at 17.
29 U.S. CONST. Preamble.
26
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principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people." 30 In
fortifying the foundation of the American republican system of
government, the natural law tradition together with the social compact
theory provided a solid grounding for basic concepts of equality,
democracy, individual rights and freedoms, and the limited powers of
government. 31 So conceived, human rights and liberties exist before
governments, and governments are instituted to safeguard and must
32
respect these rights and liberties.
The Declaration of Independence, principally drafted by Thomas
Jefferson, was both a defense of rebellion against the King and a
statement of American political and legal creed, 33 reflecting the natural
35
law tradition 34 and the social compact theory:

BAILYN, supra note 20, at 160 (quoting John Adams).
31 BURNS & PELTASON, supra note 9, at 63 (noting that as the colonists moved closer to the
Revolution, leaders such as Sam and John Adams in Massachusetts and Patrick Henry and
Thomas Jefferson in Virginia "spoke of the natural rights of men and of government resting
on the consent of the governed. They quoted Locke on individual liberty and human
rights.").
32 Professors Bums and Peltason summarized as follows the understanding of these
traditions in early America:
Most men obeyed the natural law, but living in a state of nature
was inconvenience. There were always a few lawless souls, and
whenever a person's natural rights were violated, he had to enforce the
law himself. Furthermore, when people had differences there was no
common impartial judge to whom they could turn for a decision.
Therefore, being endowed with reason, men decided to end this
inconvenience by contracting among themselves to form a society and
to establish a government for the purpose of protecting each man's
natural rights. By the terms of the social contract, each individual
promised to abide by the decisions of the majority and to surrender to
society his private right to enforce the law.
Government was thus limited by the purpose for which it was
established. It had only the authority to enforce the natural law.
When government becomes destructive of man's inalienable rights, it
ceases to have a claim on his allegience. The people then have the duty
to revolt and to create a government designed to promote their natural
rights.
Id. at 65.
33 Id. at 64.
34 Levy has argued that the Declaration does not reference the social contract theory,
suggesting that the Declaration was premised upon the natural law tradition. LEvY, supra
note 10, at 45.
35 Martin Diamond has argued that the Declaration of Independence was premised
upon the social contract theory and presented equality as the equal entitlement of all to the
rights that comprise political liberty:
30
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When in the Course of human events, it becomes
necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands
which have connected them with another, and to assume
among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal
station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God
entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind
requires that they should declare the causes which impel
them to the separation.- We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. - That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed.-That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive
of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
36
their Safety and Happiness.

The social contract theory upon which the Declaration is based
teaches not equality as such but equal political liberty. The reasoning
of the Declaration is as follows. Each man is equally born into the state
of nature in a condition of absolute independence of every other man.
That equal independence of each from all, as John Locke put it, forms a
"Title to perfect Freedom" for every man. It is this equal perfect
freedom, which men leave behind them when they quit the state of
nature, from which they derive their equal "unalienable rights" in civil
society. The equality of the Declaration, then, consists entirely in the
equal entitlement of all to the rights which comprise political liberty,
and nothing more.
Martin Diamond, "The Declaration and the Constitution: Liberty Democracy, and the
Founders," THE PUBLIC INTEREST, NO. 41, at 49 (Fall 1975).

36 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776). For Jefferson, the ideas expressed in the
Declaration were not new; rather, it was
[niot to find out new principles or new arguments never before
thought of, nor merely to say things which had never been said before,
but to place before mankind the common sense of the subject... . [I]t
was intended to be an expression of the American mind, and to give to
that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the occasion.
All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day,
whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or in the
elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney,
etc.
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In declaring the political independence of the colonies from the British
crown, Jefferson established American legal and political orthodoxy,
especially the belief in the equality of all Americans as created beings
and their endowment with certain inalienable rights.
During the Revolutionary era, Thomas Jefferson was the leading
voice emphasizing natural rights and equality, 37 yet after the Revolution,
Jefferson's thought on the natural rights of all humans and their equality
remained a powerful, shaping influence on American national identity
and political culture. For Jefferson, the rights of every individual are
grounded in the laws of nature, in the God who created nature, and not
in a grant or gift from any government. 38 Government exists to serve the

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 88 (Edward Dumbauld ed. 1955).
37 For a survey of Thomas Jefferson's view on equality, see LEVY, supra note 10, at 43-48.
38 Thomas Jefferson, Legal Argument, 1770, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 376
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892-99) ("Under the law of nature, all men are born free, every
one comes into the world with a right to his own person, which includes the liberty of
moving and using it at his own will. This is what is called personal liberty, and is given
him by the Author of nature, because necessary for his own sustenance."); Thomas
Jefferson, Rights of British America, 1774, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 209
(Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("A free people [claim] their rights as
derived from the laws of nature, and not as the gift of their chief magistrate."); Thomas
Jefferson, Rights of British America, 1774, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 211
(Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("The God who gave us life gave us liberty
at the same time; the hand of force may destroy, but cannot disjoin them."); Thomas
Jefferson, Notes on Virginia Q.XVIII, 1782, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 227
(Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("Can the liberties of a nation be thought
secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the
people that these liberties are of the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with
His wrath?"); Thomas Jefferson to John Manners, 1817, in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 124 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("The evidence of [the]
natural right [of expatriation], like that of our right to life, liberty, the use of our faculties,
the pursuit of happiness, is not left to the feeble and sophistical investigations of reason,
but is impressed on the sense of every man. We do not claim these under the charters of
kings or legislatures, but under the King of Kings. If He has made it a law in the nature of
man to pursue his own happiness, he has left him free in the choice of place as well as
mode, and we may safely call on the whole body of English jurists to produce the map on
which nature has traced for each individual the geographical line which she forbids him to
cross in pursuit of happiness.").
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interests of the governed and to enable the people to live in safety and
happiness and to enjoy their rights.39 Thus, the people possess all
40
authority and are sovereign.

39
Thomas Jefferson to Francois D'Ivernois, 1795, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 4 (Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1892-99) ("It is to secure our rights that we resort to
government at all."); Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Waring, 1801, in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 236 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("The will of the
people ... is the only legitimate foundation of any government, and to protect its free
expression should be our first object."); Thomas Jefferson to Thaddeus Kosciusko, 1810, in
12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 369 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04)
("The freedom and happiness of man ... [are] the sole objects of all legitimate
government."); Thomas Jefferson to Thaddeus Kosciusko, 1811, in 13 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 41 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("The happiness and
prosperity of our citizens ... is the only legitimate object of government and the first duty
of governors."); Thomas Jefferson to M. van der Kemp, 1812, in 13 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 135 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("The only
orthodox object of the institution of government is to secure the greatest degree of
happiness to the general mass of those associated under it."); Thomas Jefferson to A. Coray,
1823, in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 482 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed.
1903-04) ("The equal rights of man, and the happiness of ever individual, are now
acknowledged to be the only legitimate objects of government. Modern times have the
signal advantage, too, of having discovered the only device by which these rights can be
secured, to wit: government by the people, acting not in person, but by representatives
chosen by themselves, that is to say, by every man of ripe years and sane mind, who
contributes either by his purse or person to the support of his country."); Thomas Jefferson
to John Cartwright, 1824, in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 51 (Memorial ed.)
(Lipscomb & Bergh, eds. 1903-04) ("The principles of government ... [are] founded in the
rights of man.").
4
Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on French Treaties, 1793, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 227 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("I consider the people who
constitute a society or nation as the source of all authority in that nation .... "); Thomas
Jefferson to Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours 1813, in 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 197 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("[The people] are in truth
the only legitimate proprietors of the soil and government."); Thomas Jefferson to Spencer
Roane, 1821, in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 328 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds.,
Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("[It is] the people, to whom all authority belongs."); Thomas
Jefferson to William Johnson, 1823, in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451
(Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("The ultimate arbiter is the people of the
Union."); Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright, 1824, in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 45 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("The constitutions of most of
our States assert that all power is inherent in the people; that they may exercise it by
themselves in all cases to which they thing themselves competent ... , or they may act by
representatives, freely and equally chosen; that it is their right and duty to be at all times
armed; that they are entitled to freedom of person, freedom of religion, freedom of
property, and freedom of the press.").
Although the people are sovereign and
governments exist to secure the rights of the people, Jefferson recognized that the people
through their governments may restrict their natural rights. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on
Virginia Q.XVII, 1782, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 221 (Lipscomb & Bergh
eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("Our rulers can have authority over such natural rights only
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Convinced that the will of the people is the only legitimate
foundation of any government and that the will of the majority should
be the law, 41 Jefferson perceived a threat from a minority of individuals
(a faction) gaining power and using that power to oppress the people, to
eviscerate their rights, and to grant privileges to themselves. 42 Even so,
43
the majority must not disregard the rights and interests of the minority.

as we have submitted to them."); Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on Residence Bill, 1790, in 3 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 60 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("Every
man, and every body of men on earth, possess the right of self-government .... This, like
all other natural rights, may be abridged or modified in its exercise by their own consent,
or by the law of those who depute them, if they meet in the right of others.").
41 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia Q.VIII, 1782, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 120 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("Civil government being
the sole object of forming societies, its administration must be conducted by common
consent."); Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 1792, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 397 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("The measures of the fair
majority ... ought to be respected."); Thomas Jefferson, The Anas, 1793, in 1 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("I subscribe to
the principle, that the will of the majority honestly expressed should give law."); Thomas
Jefferson, Address to the Cherokee Nation, 1809, in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
456 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("All ...being equally free, no one has
a right to say what shall be law for the others. Our way is to put these questions to the
vote, and to consider that as law for which the majority votes."); Thomas Jefferson to
William Johnson, 1823, in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 440 (Lipscomb & Bergh
eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("At the formation of our government, many had formed their
political opinions on European writings and practices, believing the experiences of old
countries, and especially of England, abusive as it was, to be a safer guide than mere
theory. The doctrines of Europe were, that men in numerous associations cannot be
restrained within the limits of order and justice, but by forces physical and moral, wielded
over them by authorities independent of their will. Hence their organization of kings,
hereditary nobles, and priests.").
42 Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Allowance Bill, 1778, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 231 (Ed. Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) ("It [is] inconsistent with the principles of civil
liberty, and contrary to the natural rights of the other members of the society, that any
body of men therein should have authority to enlarge their own powers, prerogatives or
emoluments without restraint."); Thomas Jefferson, to Annapolis Citizens, 1809, in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 337 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04)
("Where the law of the majority ceases to be acknowledged, there government ends, the
law of the strongest takes its place, and life and property are his who can take them.").
43

Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural, 1801, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 318

(Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("Bear in mind this sacred principle, that
though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be
reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect, and
to violate would be oppression."); Thomas Jefferson to Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours,
1816, in 14 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 490 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed.
1903-04) ("The majority, oppressing an individual, is guilty of a crime, abuses its strength,
and by acting on the law of the strongest breaks up the foundations of society.").
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Jefferson believed that equality is essential to the American form of
government. 44 For Jefferson, human equality requires equal treatment
by the government: "[an equal application of law to every condition of
man is fundamental," 45 "[the] best principles [of our republic] secure to
all citizens a perfect equality of rights," 46 and "[tihe most sacred of the
duties of a government [is] to do equal and impartial justice to all its
citizens." 47 The government, thus, should not distinguish among
individuals based upon country, class, or birth or grant unequal
privileges.48 Jefferson, however, recognized that not all humans were

Jefferson wrote that "[tlhe equality among our citizens [is] essential to the
maintenance of republican government." Thomas Jefferson, Thoughts on Lotteries, 1826, in
17 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 461 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 190304). John Adams too valued equality. However, for Adams, equality did not involve any
natural or intrinsic equality in humans; rather, equality referred to equality of treatment:
Inequalities of Mind and Body are so established by God Almighty in
his constitution of Human Nature that no Art or policy can ever plain
them down to a Level. I have never read Reasoning more absurd,
Sophistry more gross, in proof of the Athanasian Creed, or
Transubstantiation, than the subtle labours of Helvetius and Rousseau
to demonstrate the natural Equality of Mankind. Jus cuique [justice for
everyone]; the golden rule; do as you would be done by; is all the
Equality that can be supported or defended by reason, or reconciled to
common Sense.
John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, in 2 CAPPON 355 (1813); see also DAVID MCCULLOUGH,
JOHN ADAMS 377 (2001).
45 Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, 1807, in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 341
(Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04).
46
Thomas Jefferson, Reply to the Citizens of Wilmington, 1809, in 16 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 336 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04).
47
Thomas Jefferson, Note in Destutt de Tracy, "Political Economy," 1816, in 14 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 465 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04).
4
Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 1784, in 4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 218 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("The hereditary branches of
modem governments are the patrons of privilege and prerogative, and not of the natural
rights of the people, whose oppressors they generally are."); Thomas Jefferson, Answers to
de Meusnier Questions, 1786, in 17 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 89 (Lipscomb &
Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("In America, no other distinction between man and
man had ever been known but that of persons in office exercising powers by authority of
the laws, and private individuals. Among these last, the poorest laborer stood on equal
ground with the wealthiest millionaire, and generally on a more favored one whenever
their rights seem to jar."); Id. ("Of distinction by birth or badge, [Americans] had no more
idea than they had of the mode of existence in the moon or planets. They had heard only
that there were such, and knew that they must be wrong."); Thomas Jefferson, First
Inaugural, 1801, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 320 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds.,
Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("[We in America entertain] a due sense of our equal right to the use
of our own faculties, to the acquisitions of our own industry, to honor and confidence from
our fellow-citizens resulting not from birth but from our actions and their sense of them.");
Thomas Jefferson to Hugh White, 1801, in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 258
44
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secure in the inalienable rights given by God, and it was his "sincere[]
pray[er] that all the members of the human family may, in the time
prescribed by the Father of us all, find themselves securely established in
49
the enjoyment of life, liberty, and happiness."
Jefferson also acknowledged the important place equality held in
"The foundation on which all [our state
state constitutions:
constitutions] are built is the natural equality of man, the denial of every
pre-eminence but that annexed to legal office and particularly the denial
of a pre-eminence by birth." 50 Later he would write:
The Constitutions of our several States vary more or less
in some particulars. But there are certain principles in
which all agree, and which all cherish as vitally essential
to the protection of the life, liberty, property, and safety
of the citizen: 1. Freedom of religion, restricted only
from acts of trespass on that of others; 2. Freedom of
person, securing every one from imprisonment or other
bodily restraint but by the laws of the land. This is
effected by the well-known law of habeas corpus; 3. Trial
by jury, the best of all safeguards for the person, the
property, and the fame of every individual; 4. The
exclusive right of legislation and taxation in the
representatives of the people; 5. Freedom of the press,
51
subject only to liability for personal injuries.

(Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("To unequal privileges among members of
the same society the spirit of our nation is, with one accord, adverse."); Thomas Jefferson to
the Emperor of Morocco, 1803, in 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 136 (Lipscomb &
Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("All religions are equally independent here, our laws
knowing no distinction of country, of classes among individuals and with nations, our
[creed] is justice and reciprocity."); Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Bloodgood and Hammond,
1809, in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 318 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed.
1903-04) ("The true principles of our Constitution ... are wisely opposed to all
perpetuations of power, and to every practice which may lead to hereditary
establishments."); Thomas Jefferson to A. Coray, 1823, in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 483 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04) ("Hereditary bodies ...
always on the watch for their own aggrandizement, profit of every opportunity of
advancing the privileges of their order, and encroaching on the rights of the people.").
49
Thomas Jefferson, Reply to Ellicot Thomas et al., 1807, in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 290 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04)
50 Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 1784, in 4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 217 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04).
51

Thomas Jefferson to A. Coray, 1823, in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 489

(Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04).
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The American Revolution did not simply bring about political
changes; it also spawned dramatic social changes.5 2 Like waves on an
ocean, democratic forces, including a recognition of self-evident truths
and inalienable rights, a belief in the equality of all individuals, and a
populist spirit, rippled throughout the new nation and new territories.
During the first several generations following the Revolution, democratic
and egalitarian ideals became ingrained in American consciousness and
leavened American popular culture.5 3 As regard for tradition, authority,
education, and station lessened and elite control over politics, law,
religion, medicine, and the press diminished, ordinary individuals
reveled in their newfound authority and freedom and celebrated their
equality. 4
These social changes were nowhere more evident or dramatic than
in America's churches and the religious movements that swept through
the states and territories during the first half century after the
Revolution, during a period known as the Second Great Awakening. 55 In
the early American republic, a symbiotic relationship existed between
politics and religion,5 6 and populist democracy and populist Christianity

52

NATHAN 0.

HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 6, 12-16

(1989).
53 Historian Sidney E. Mead perceptively noted that the period between the Revolution
and the Civil War was marked by six images of man, society, government, and destiny: the
free individual with full opportunity to develop every latent possibility and natural power;
the concept of human and social perfectability; the belief in human and social progress; the
equality of humans to be act as free individuals; the inclination toward individual consent
and voluntary participation; and the tendency toward paternalism and social reform.
SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 90102 (1963).
54
HATCH, supra note 52, at 1746.
55
HATCH, supra note 52, at 5-6; MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 144 (1992).
56
Alexis de Tocqueville, a French observer of early nineteenth century American
society, remarked:
On my arrival in the United States the religious aspect of the
country was the first thing that struck my attention; and the longer I
stayed there, the more I perceived the great political consequences
resulting from this new state of things. In France I had almost always
seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom marching in
opposite directions. But in America I found they were intimately
united and that they reigned in common over the same country.
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 308 (Henry Reeve trans., 1835 & 1840;
Francis Bowen trans., 1862) (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945).
Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of
society, but it must be regarded as the first of their political
institutions; for if it does not impart a taste for freedom, it facilitates

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 [2004], Art. 8

506

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.38

spread together and took root in the new states and territories, resulting
in the democratization of American Christianity and the Christianization
of American society.5 7 In this fertile soil, egalitarian forces contributed to
dynamic developments in America's religious history.
In the eastern states and on the frontier, the religious movements
that succeeded most profoundly were generally those movements whose
leaders wedded most closely their basic beliefs and practices with
popular appeal and the ideals of populist democracy. 58 During the
decades prior to the Revolution, the Congregationalists, the
Presbyterians, and the Episcopalians were among the religious groups
that dominated the colonial religious landscape, and these groups
emphasized the sovereignty of God, the inability of sinful people to save
themselves, and God's election of some to salvation. 59 However, during
the decades following the Revolution, upstart groups such as the
Methodists, the Baptists, and the Disciples of Christ dramatically
eclipsed those that had dominated prior to the Revolution, 60 and these

the use of it. Indeed, it is in this same point of view that the
inhabitants of the United States themselves look upon religious belief.
I do not know whether all Americans have a sincere faith in their
religion--for who can search the human heart?--but I am certain that
they hold it to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican
institutions. This opinion is not peculiar to a class of citizens or to a
party, but it belongs to the whole nation and to every rank of society.
Id. at 305-06.
57 HATCH, supra note 52, at 5; see also SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 387 (1972) (noting that "evangelical Protestant churches, with their
message and methods tuned to the patriotic aspirations of a young nation, reached their
high point of cultural influence"). For an overview of these developments in early
American religious history, see generally id. at 403-71.
58 HATCH, supra note 52, at 3-9; NOLL, supra note 55, at 152-53.
59 NOLL, supra note 55, at 169-70; ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY 54-56 (1992)
AMERICA, 1776-1990:
[hereinafter FINKE & STARK, CHURCHING]; see also Roger Finke & Rodney Stark, How the
Upstart Sects Won America: 1776-1850, J. FOR SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 28, 31 (1989)
[hereinafter Finke & Stark, Upstart].
60
FINKE & STARK, CHURCHING, supra note 59, at 59-108 (discussing how the "upstart
sects," including the Methodists and the Baptists, "won" America); AHLSTROM, supra note
57, at 435-54 (discussing the growth of popular denominations such as the Methodists and
Baptists, the emergence of the Disciples of Christ, and the slow expansion of the formerly
dominant Congregational, Presbyterian, and Episcopal denominations). Also among the
groups experiencing remarkable growth in America during this period were black
churches, the Mormons, the Lutherans, the Unitarians and Universalists, the German and
Dutch Reformed, the Quakers, and the Roman Catholics. See Finke and Stark, Upstart,
supra note 59, at 31. For some of these groups (i.e. Lutherans, German and Dutch
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upstart groups emphasized the primacy of the individual conscience and
6
the freedom and ability of every person to come to salvation. 1
These burgeoning groups blended democratic and egalitarian
ingredients with their religious messages to remarkable effect. In
promoting democratic and egalitarian values, this religious populism
exhibited a distrust of learned theologians, professional elitism,
traditional orthodoxies, authoritarian structures, and established
62
institutions, but a supreme confidence in the ordinary person.
Methodist preacher Lorenzo Dow reflected, as well as anyone, the
egalitarian ethos that marked the first half century after the Revolution
when he wrote:
By what rule of right can one man exercise authority
with a command over others? Either it must be a gift of
God, or, secondly, it must be delegated by the people or less, thirdly, it must be ASSUMED!
A power without a right, is assumption; and must be
considered as a piece of unjust tyranny....
But if all men are "BORN EQUAL," and endowed
with unalienable RIGHTS by their CREATOR, in the
blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happinessthen there can be no just reason, as a cause, why he may
or should not think, and judge, and act for himself in
63
matters of religion, opinion, and private judgment.
As these democratically-energized religious movements expanded,
African-Americans and women became fuller participants in many
Christian groups and even leaders in church and public life.64 Also
during this period, camp meetings, which have been called "festivals of
democracy," 65 became prevalent, with multitudes of ordinary people,
black and white, men and women, gathering to listen to preachers who

Reformed, and Roman Catholic), immigration accounts for a significant aspect of their
growth during this period. See AHLSTROM, supra note 57, at 540; NOLL, supranote 55, at 5.
61
HATCH, supranote 52, at 35, 40-43; NOLL, supra note 55, at 169-70.
62 HATCH, supra note 52, at 9-11, 17-46.
,3

LORENZO Dow, HISTORY OF COSMOPOLITE 356-57 (1814).

64

HATCH, supranote 52, at 78-80, 102-13; NOLL, supra note 55, at 180-85.

65

HATCH, supra note 52, at 58 (quoting MICHAEL CHEVALIER, SOCIETY, MANNERS AND
BEING A SERIES OF LETTERS FROM NORTH AMERICA 317

POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES:

(1839)).
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typically delivered messages with a strong egalitarian and democratic
flavor. 66
Indiana inherited this culture and history and the values that
flourished in early America. The pioneers who settled in Indiana
brought with them a host of beliefs, ideals, and institutions, as one
leading Indiana historian has written:
The image of the individual pioneer confronting the
inhospitable wilderness is a false one. Not only did
nearly all pioneers settle as families, but they also built
social relationships beyond the family. They brought
with them a knowledge of community institutions and a
desire for social ties and social order, and they expanded
and developed these ways of living together to create a
society that shared fundamental values and beliefs and
that gave individuals a sense of living among others and
67
even a responsibility for others.
Established in 1800, the Indiana Territory was first governed under
the Northwest Ordinance. 68 In this territorial setting, southern planters,
a minority with aristocratic tendencies, dominated governmental
leadership and established little regard for the ability of the common
person to criticize or direct the conduct of governmental officials or to
assume the responsibility of self-government. 69 However, the poor
farmers and frontiersmen who opposed the southern planters and
advocated democratic principles insisted that "even the poorest had a
right to a voice in the determination of the policies which affect his life as
well as the career of the richest."70 During this territorial period, the
democratic forces took significant steps in subduing the more aristocratic

66

NOLL, supra note 55, at 167 (1992); FINKE & STARK, CHURCHING, supra note 59, at 92-

105.
67

68

JAMES H. MADISON, THE INDIANA WAY 98 (1986).
WILLIAM P. McLAUCHLAN, THE INDIANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 2

(1996).
69

JOHN D. BARNHART, VALLEY OF DEMOCRACY: THE FRONTIER VERSUS THE PLANTATION

IN THE OHIO VALLEY, 1775-1818, 195 (1953) (reprint 1969) [hereinafter BARNHART]; see also
John D. Barnhard, Democratic Influences in TerritorialIndiana,43 INDIANA MAc. OF HIST. 8-22

(1947).
BARNHART, supra note 69, at 195. The struggle between an aristocratic minority of
wealthy landowners and a democratic majority of poor common folks was not unique to
Indiana, but was experienced through the Ohio Valley during the first four decades
following American independence. Id. at 3-160, 197-235.
70
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forces that prevailed in the eastern and southern portions of America
71
and were gathering a foot-hold in Indiana.
On May 13, 1816, Congress approved the election of delegates to a
constitutional convention in Indiana, and destined Indiana to be a free
state from its very inception. 72 The delegates to the Constitutional
Convention of 1816 met in Corydon beginning on June 10, 1816. 73 The
forty-three delegates were quickly chosen and included mostly farmers,
about a dozen ministers, some officeholders, and a small number of
lawyers. 74 Meeting in sessions between June 10 and June 29, the
delegates signed the new Indiana Constitution on June 29, 1816, which
became effective immediately without being submitted to Indiana
voters. 75
The 1816 Constitution drew heavily upon the Ohio, Kentucky, and
During the 1816 Convention, the
Pennsylvania constitutions. 76
democratic voices of popular participation in government prevailed over
the aristocratic voices of elitism, ultimately ensuring that the provisions
adopted would advance principles of democracy and political
Natural law and natural rights theory shaped the
inclusion. 77
philosophy of the framers of the 1816 Constitution, 78 and the language
they adopted reflected natural law conceptions and terms. 79 Under the
1816 Constitution, the people were recognized to have inherent political
power as the political sovereigns, and the people would rule through
their General Assembly, which was the branch of state government with

Id. at 176-77.
MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 68, at 2.
73
Id. at3.
74
WILLIAM E. WILSON, INDIANA: A HISTORY 91 (1966). However, another historian has
written that more than half the delegates had some legal training or experience. HOWARD
H. PECKHAM, INDIANA: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY (1978).
MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 68, at 4.
75
76
Id. at 3; WILSON, supra note 74, at 93. Professor Wilson has noted that the delegates
copied large parts of Articles I and III verbatim from the Ohio Constitution, and the
remaining twelve articles were patterned after the Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
constitutions. WILSON, supra note 74, at 93. These three states had been the birthplaces of
many of the delegates. Id. at 93. Notwithstanding the substantial borrowing, Article IX,
which included sections on education and state institutions among other things, represents
original work by the delegates. Id. at 93-95.
77
BARNHART, supra note 69, at 193; C.A. BYERS, Growth of the Constitutionof Indiana,6 THE
INDIANIAN 279-80 (1890); PECKHAM, supranote 74, at 44-45.
78
Pricev. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 958-59 (Ind. 1993).
71

72

79

Id. at 959 & n.4; JOHN D. BARNHART & DONALD F. CARMONY, 1 INDIANA FROM

FRONTIER TO INDUSTRIAL COMMONWEALTH 156 (1954).
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the most power.80 Thus, a populist character and a liberal Jeffersonian
Republicanism marked the 1816 Constitution.1
As pioneers migrated to Indiana, they often founded communities
where people of like mind and similar values could come together to
live, construct their unique social order, and establish utopian
experiments consistent with their values.82 Some of these communities
were religiously motivated, but others were constituted upon more
secular goals.8 3 One such secular community, the "Community of
Equality," 84 founded by Robert Owen in the mid-1820s, sought a just and
equal community through a rejection of the traditional family structure,
religion, and private property. 85 This community abolished private
property, promoted the equality of men and women (although blacks
were not included), encouraged the contribution of all members, and
shared its benefits equally among all.86 Although this community
ultimately did not succeed as an experiment, a number of the people
brought together by this experience made lasting impacts on American
and Indiana history, most notably one of Robert Owen's sons, Robert
Dale Owen, who would become a central figure in Indiana constitutional
history, promote equality as a fundamental constitutional value, and
87
advocate the rights of women.
Considering that "[o]f all the social and community institutions that
flourished on the frontier none was more important than evangelical
Protestantism," 88 Indiana's religious history is significant to the story of

80

DONALD F. CARMONY, INDIANA, 1816-1850:

THE PIONEER ERA 1-2 (1998); MADISON,

supra note 67, at 127; MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 68, at 3; WILSON, supranote 74, at 97.
81
Price, 622 N.E.2d at 962; CARMONY, supra note 80, at 1, 452.
82
MADISON, supra note 67, at 115-20; PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 56-60, 80-85; WILSON,
supra note 74, at 62-81.
83 MADISON, supra note 67, at 115-17; PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 56-60; WILSON, supra
note 74, at 62-63. For a general discussion of these communities in early American
religious history, see AHLSTROM, supra note 57, at 491-509.
84
85
86

WILSON, supranote 74, at 63.
MADISON, supranote 67, at 117; WILSON, supra note 74, at 69-71.

MADISON, supra note 67, at 117; PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 56-57; WILSON, supra note
74, at 69-71.
87
MADISON, supra note 67, at 119-20; WILSON, supra note 74, at 76-80; see infra text
accompanying note 222.
88
MADISON, supra note 67, at 98. Peckham has written that "Indiana seemed indeed to
be a religious state, and at mid-[nineteenth-]century it was overwhelmingly Protestant."
PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 88.
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equality in Indiana. 89 The open-air camp meetings or revivals that had
accompanied the dramatic growth of certain Protestant denominations in
the first half of the nineteenth century also came to Indiana with similar
effect, but in smaller numbers than in Kentucky and Tennessee. 90 These
camp meetings "appealed to people as individuals." 91 As in other
portions of the country, the Methodists, the Baptists, and the Disciples of
Christ were among the religious groups that prospered the most as they
blended the American democratic spirit with their doctrinally grounded
belief in the equality of individuals. 92 These religious traditions

89

For extensive discussions of religion in Indiana, see ELIZABETH K. NOTTINGHAM,

METHODISM AND THE FRONTIER:
INDIANA PROVING GROUND (1966); L.C. RUDOLPH,
HOOSIER FAITHS (1995) [hereinafter RUDOLPH, FAITHS]; L.C. RUDOLPH, HOOSIER ZION: THE
PRESBYTERIANS IN EARLY INDIANA (1963). In discussing religion in frontier Indiana, one

historian has written:
[Flrontiersmen are men of faith. They do not see either the wilderness
or themselves as they are, but as they will become. The frontier was
the Promised Land, which could not be entered save by those who had
faith. They were idealists, believing in the perfectibility of man and
hence in both individualism and reform-but not in tolerance.
Toleration implies a critical and speculative outlook, a suspension of
judgment, or indifference; whereas frontiersmen have too intense a
faith and too much idealism to be either hesitant or indifferent. New
land to settle invites and encourages strong individuals of quick, sure
judgments who tend to think alike. They have to possess courage,
perseverance, industry, mutual concern, and they respect others who
have the same qualities.
PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 79.
90 MADISON, supra note 67, at 101-02; PECKHAM, supranote 74, at 85-86. For a discussion
of Methodist camp meetings in Indiana in the second decade of the nineteenth century, see
NOTlNGHAM, supra note 89, at 59-70.
91 PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 85.
92 See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text; PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 86-87;
RUDOLPH, FAITHS,supra note 89, at x-xi. One historian has explained:
By 1820, Indiana's inhabitants were in large part extreme
Arminians in theology, whether they knew it or not. Not for them was
predestined election, a mysterious caprice of God, but everyone could
achieve regeneration and salvation for himself by confession and good
works. Their faith was consistent with their frontier experience, and
the circuit riders of the Methodist denomination preached that good
works would be rewarded. Nature was a challenge; men were judged
on what they did with it. A corollary of that belief was the message of
the Old Testament that the earth was provided for man to exploit.
Further, like forests and swamps and wild animals, the Indians, too,
were obstacles to be removed. They were also probably minions of the
Devil, there to be regenerated by Christianity and agriculture if
possible, or forced out, if not; tolerance of willful heathen was no
virtue at all.
The real virtues were good works, industry,
perseverance, and faith in the future. Ultimately, these were regarded
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concerned themselves with the relationship between each individual and
God as well as the relationships among people, and thus they sought to
shape the social and political order and to exert influence on matters of
morality. 93 Methodism in particular spawned an atmosphere that was
open, personal, and democratic. 94
The Quakers, who were outspoken in their opposition to slavery,
joined with other religious groups to attack the institution, and most
95
Hoosiers viewed slavery as a violation of the laws of God and man.
However, racial prejudice was widespread in pioneer Indiana, and even
among religiously devout Hoosiers, negative racial sentiment was not
uncommon, although strong forces against slavery 96 and movements to
improve the conditions faced by the African-American community were
97
also found.
By 1850, a broad range of religious beliefs and practices was found
among the expanding population of Indiana,98 and the wide array of
religious communities included Jewish, Roman Catholic, Baptist,
Brethren, Disciples of Christ, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and
Quaker.99 In Indiana, the variety of religious communities and beliefs
fostered competition among the groups and some conflict, but no single
religious tradition reigned supreme.100 The 1850 census indicated that,
among the population of nearly a million inhabitants, more than 2,400
churches could be found in Indiana; thus, one church existed for every
530 people. 10 1 Protestant churches were most numerous with Methodist
churches numbering 795, Baptist churches 770, Presbyterian churches
295, Christian (Disciples of Christ) churches 193, Quaker (Society of

as American virtues. They left no room for predestination, servility to
creeds or priests, and other-worldly concerns.
PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 80.
93 MADISON, supranote 67, at 104-08.
94

Id. at 100 (citing NOTYINGHAM, supra note 89).

95 Id. at 99, 106-07.
96 The "underground railroad," organized by a Quaker, Levi Coffin, provided a
pathway through Indiana for slaves to flee the South to freedom in the North. PECKHAM,
supra note 74, at 65-66.
97 For additional discussion of the complex story of race in Indiana, see infra text
accompany notes 232-41.
98

RUDOLPH, FAITHS, supranote 89, at x-xi.

99

See BARNHART & CARMONY, supra note 79, at 377-87; MADISON, supra note 67, at 98-

104; PECKHAM, supranote 74, at 85-90.
100 MADISON, supra note 67, at 100.

PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 88. Based upon figures from the federal census, Professor
Madison sets the number of churches as 2,032. MADISON, supra note 67, at 99.
101
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Friends) churches 91, Lutheran churches 59, and United Brethren
churches 59.102 Methodist adherents numbered 180 per 1,000 in the
population, and Baptist adherents numbered 80 per 1,000 in the
population. 10 3 However, the combined number of Congregationalists,
Episcopalians, and Presbyterians totaled only 51 out of 1,000 in the
Even so, many Indiana residents were
Indiana population. 1°4
unaffiliated with any religious community, including religious
freethinkers. 105 By the early 1850s, the African Methodist Episcopal
Church had 1,387 members, and fewer than 200 African-Americans were
10 6
members in the Methodist church.
Indiana's political history following the adoption of the 1816
Constitution is also important to the story of equality in Indiana. By the
1820s, equality had joined the idea of liberty as a core aspect of
republicanism for many Americans. 0 7 Beginning in 1824, with Andrew
Jackson's first run for the presidency, and continuing through the last
stages leading up to the Civil War, a political movement gained strength
and swept across America, stirring the democratic spirit and indelibly
inscribing the value of equality on the conscience of the young
republic. 08 This movement, Jacksonian Democracy, was characterized

102

PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 88 (citing THORNBROUGH & RIKER, READINGS IN INDIANA

Catholic churches numbered sixty-nine in 1850. Id. However, by 1916,
with the influx of immigrants, Catholics became the largest denomination in Indiana, with
numbers totaling approximately 272,000. Id. at 89-90. The number of Jewish persons in
Indiana has been quite small. In 1890, the number of Jews in Indiana was 3,600. Id. at 88.
103
FINKE & STARK, CHURCHING, supra note 59, at 287.
HISTORY 477-78).

105

Id.
MADISON, supra note 67, at 99.

106

Id. at 108.

107

HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA 50

104

(1990).
THOMAS A. BAILEY & DAVID M. KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN PAGEANT: A HISTORY OF
THE REPUBLIC 221-55 (7th ed. 1983). Professor Remini has noted that one of the two basic
qualities that characterized Americans in the Jacksonian era was equality. ROBERT V.
REMINi, THE REVOLUTIONARY AGE OF ANDREW JACKSON 17 (1976). He wrote:
108

The second basic quality about these Americans was that they
were champions of equality-that is, of course, for those who were
white and male. Women did not need equality. They were up there
on their pedestals shining forth beauty and goodness. To give them
equality would demean their status in society. So the poor unfortunate
female had no rights. She was chattel. She could not vote or hold
office; her "right" to property was limited; she could not enter most
professions; she could not make a will, sign a contract, or witness a
deed without her father's or husband's consent; and her children could
be taken from her if her husband so directed. Nor was there any
concerted drive for equality for blacks or Indians on the part of part of
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by a stiff opposition to economic and political privilege, a distrust of
entrenched government power, a belief in limited government, and a
commitment to the protection of the people and natural rights. 10 9
Jacksonian Democrats emphasized states' rights, advocated equality of
opportunity, exalted the equality and power of the common person, and
represented the farmers, the clerks, the shopkeepers, the laborers, and
the urban masses. 110 Notwithstanding the focus on the common person
and equality, the Jacksonian movement was "virtually indifferent to
social inequalities" such as women's rights, prison reform, educational
improvements, protection of minors, and other forms of social
betterment, and on the issues of the treatment of Native Americans and
slaves, the record of the Jacksonians is marked by bigotry and
mistreatment, greed and injustice.'
In declaring his veto of the 1832 Bank bill, Jackson urged:
It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too
often bend the acts of government to their selfish
purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist under

most Americans. Women, blacks, and Indians just didn't enter the
thinking of these people when they argued for equality.
Id. Likewise, Professor Watson has argued that Jackson viewed political equality as the
cornerstone of the American Republic. WATSON, supra note 107, at 11 (quoting a letter by
Jackson in 1833 in which Jackson called "equality among the people in the rights conferred
by government" the "great radical principal of freedom"). For a comprehensive review of
Andrew Jackson's life and work, see generally ROBERT V. REMINI, 1 ANDREW JACKSON AND
THE COURSE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 1767-1821 (1977), 2 ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE
OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 1822-1832 (1981), 3 ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1833-1845 (1984) [hereinafter REMINI]. For a review of the political
movement associated with Andrew Jackson, see GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE AWAKENING
OF AMERICAN NATIONALISM 1815-1828 (1965); ESSAYS ON JACKSONIAN AMERICA (Frank Otto
Gatell ed., 1970); THE AGE OF JACKSON (Robert V. Remini ed., 1972); ROBERT V. REMINI, THE
LEGACY OF ANDREW JACKSON: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY, INDIAN REMOVAL, AND SLAVERY
(1988) [hereinafter REMINI, ESSAYS]; ROBERT V. REMINI, THE REVOLUTIONARY AGE OF
ANDREW JACKSON (1976) [hereinafter REMINI, REVOLUTIONARYJ; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON (1953); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN
AMERICA 1815-1846 (1991); F.F. VAN DEUSEN, THE JACKSONIAN ERA 1828-1848 (1959);
WATSON, supra note 107.
109 MARVIN MEYERS, The Jacksonian Persuasion, in ESSAYS ON JACKSONIAN AMERICA

206-15
(Frank Otto Gatell ed., 1970); REMINi, supra note 108, at xi-xxvi; REMINI, ESSAYS, supra note

108, at 7-44; REMINI, REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 108, at 15-16.
110 CARMONY, supra note 80, at 573; REMINI, supra note 108, at xi-xxvi; REMINI, ESSAYS,

supra note 108, at 7-44; REMINI, REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 108, at 14-15.
111 REMINI, supra note 108, at xix; see also WATSON, supra note 107, at 13-14 (noting the
"undemocratic" quality of Jacksonian Democracy as to slaves and women).
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every just government. Equality of talents, of education,
or of wealth can not be produced by human institutions.
In the full enjoyment of the gifts of heaven and the fruits
of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is
equally entitled to protection by law; but when the laws
undertake to add to these natural and just advantages
artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and
exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the
potent more powerful, the humble members of society the farmer, mechanics, and laborers-who have neither
the time nor the means of securing like favors to
themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of
their Government. There are no necessary evils in
government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would
confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its
rains, shower it favor alike on the high and low, the rich
and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing....
Nor is our Government to be maintained or our
Union preserved by invasions of the rights and powers
of the several States. In thus attempting to make our
General Government strong we make it weak. Its true
strength consists in leaving individuals and States as
much as possible to themselves - in making itself felt,
not in its power, but in its beneficence; not in its control,
but in its protection; not in binding the States more
closely to the center, but leaving each to move
unobstructed in its orbit.
Experience should teach us wisdom. Most of the
difficulties our Government now encounters and most of
the dangers which impend over our Union has sprung
from an abandonment of the legitimate objects of
Government by our national legislation, and the
adoption of such principles as are embodied in this act.
Many of our rich men have not been content with equal
protection and equal benefits, but have besought us to
make them richer by act of Congress. By attempting to
gratify their desires we have in the results of our
legislation arrayed section against section, interest
against interest, and man against man, in a fearful
commotion which threatens to shake the foundations of
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our Union. It is time to pause in our career to review
our principles, and if possible revive that devoted
which
compromise
of
and
spirit
patriotism
distinguished the sages of the Revolution and the fathers
of our Union. If we can not at once, in justice to interests
vested under improvident legislation, make our
Government what it ought to be, we can at least take a
stand against all new grants of monopolies and
exclusive privileges, against any prostitution of our
Government to advancement of the few at the expense
of the many, and in favor of compromise and gradual
reform in our code of laws and system of political
2
economy."
In his farewell address, Jackson warned that unless Americans checked
the "spirit of monopoly and thirst for exclusive privileges you will in the
end find that the most important powers of the Government have been
given or bartered away." 113 The Jacksonian movement became a potent
and revolutionary political force, completing America's transition from
4
monarchy to aristocracy to democracy."
Andrew Jackson found vigorous support in Indiana, and significant
majorities of Indiana voters backed Andrew Jackson in his bids for the
presidency in 1824, 1828, and 1832, although Jackson did not prevail in
the 1824 presidential election. 115 Following the 1828 election, those loyal
to the Jackson organization were installed in federal offices in Indiana,
and by 1832 Jackson supporters filled appointed and elective offices
16
throughout the state."
In the 1840s, the Democrats consolidated their dominance in Indiana
over the Whig party, the successors to the Federalists and the
predecessors of the Republicans. Accusing Whigs of mismanagement
and corruption, identifying the state's economic troubles and failed
internal improvements with the Whigs, and arguing that the Whigs were
the party of the aristocracy and of the merchants and bankers who used
the government for their own private benefit, the Democrats claimed to
be the party of the common person. Thus, the Democrats invoked the

2 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1152-54 (1897).
113 Id. at 1525.
114 REMINI, ESSAYS, supra note 108, at 7-44.
115 MADISON, supra note 67, at 133-34; WILSON, supra note 74, at 98.
116 MADISON, supra note 67, at 134; WILSON, supra note 74, at 98.
112
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Jeffersonian and the Jacksonian legacies of democracy, individual rights,
7
and limited governments.1
As these democratic and egalitarian currents converged in Indiana
during the first half of the nineteenth century 18 and as Indiana became
increasingly aware of significant problems in state and local governance
under the 1816 Constitution,11 9 sentiment grew in Indiana like in other
states that progress and reform required the adoption of a new state
constitution, that the Indiana Constitution should be rewritten.120
Among the moving forces behind the decision to rewrite the Indiana
Constitution were perceptions promoted by Jacksonian Democrats that
the legislature had too much power, that more frequent elections and
more elective officers were necessary, and that the people no longer
controlled government. 121 Additionally, the people came to believe that
the General Assembly was in session too often, chose too many state
officials, was too occupied with local and special legislation such as the
granting of divorces and micro-managing of local issues, and hid
unpopular legislation in popular bills that addressed very different
subjects.122 Hoosiers also became concerned that the State was granting
money from the treasury or public property to individuals, 123 had

117 MADISON, supra note 67, at 137-38.

Even as these egalitarian currents swept through Indiana in the first half of the
nineteenth century and the common person gained increasingly greater status, Indianans
swept the Indian tribes from the state. During this period, Hoosiers, through their
government and with the help of the federal government, acquired title to Indian lands and
actively (and sometimes forcibly) removed Indians from the state. Id. at 122-26; PECKHAM,
supranote 74, at 60-61; WILSON, supra note 74, at 3840.
119 One historian has provided the following description of the first forty years of Indiana
as a state:
In the first forty years of statehood, Hoosiers were sanguine, yet
uncertain of the direction they wanted to take. Freedom to manage
their own affairs, after sixteen years of appointed officials and outside
threats, was exhilarating, but sign posts were missing. Consequently,
they would try more than one life style, entertain various expressions
of Christian faith, go at education backwards, rush disastrously into
internal improvements, pursue inconsistent racial policies, join new
political parties, move their capital, rewrite their state constitution, and
argue vehemently about extinguishing slavery in the nation. But
nothing dimmed their faith in the perfectibility of mankind or in
themselves. They would prevail.
PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 46.
120 CARMONY, supra note 80, at 405; MADISON, supra note 67, at 138-39.
121 WILSON, supra note 74, at 101.
122 MADISON, supra note 67, at 139; WILSON, supra note 74, at 101.
123 HOUSE JOURNAL, 33d sess. 24 (1849).
118
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overextended itself financially, and had become heavily indebted
through its involvement in banking and massive internal
improvements. 124
Among these factors, the problem of local and special legislation was
of central concern. In the 1840s, the General Assembly enacted
increasingly more and more local and special legislation,125 which
resulted in the perception that local and special legislation was a
On January 11, 1848, Governor James Whitcomb
growing evil.
remarked:
Occasion has been repeatedly taken in my former
messages, to allude to the great amount of our local or
special legislation, the danger of injustice by its means to
individual interests, its expense to the treasury, and the
large portion of time it necessarily occupies to the
detriment of that mature and thorough consideration
126
which is due to subjects of a general character.
"If calling a
On December 6, 1848, Governor Whitcomb added:
convention to amend the constitution were productive of no other result
than furnishing an effectual remedy for this growing evil [of special and
127
local legislation], it would be abundantly justified."
In 1849, Indiana voters approved the calling of a convention to
rewrite the Constitution. 128 At that time, the party of Andrew Jackson
dominated the Indiana General Assembly with approximately sixtythree percent Democrats to thirty-seven percent Whigs. 129 Thus, a

124 CARMONY, supra note 80, at 405; McLAUCHLAN, supra note 68, at 8-9; PECKHAM, supra

note 74, at 62-64; WILSON, supra note 74, at 101.
125 HOUSE JOURNAL, 33d sess. 23 (1849).
126 HOUSE JOURNAL, 32d sess. 131 (1848).
127 HOUSE JOURNAL, 33d sess. 24 (1849). One year later, on December 4, 1849, Governor

Paris C. Dunning in addressing the General Assembly commented:
Special legislation is a growing evil which has attracted much
attention amongst the masses of the people, and to which much well
founded opposition exists in the public mind. Indeed, it has for years
past engaged full three-fourths of the time of the General Assembly, to
the exclusion (from their due consideration) of many other questions
of great importance to the people of the State.
1 CHARLES KETLEBOROUGH, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA 195 (1916).
128 WILSON, supra note 74, at 97.
129 MCLAUCHLAN, supranote 68, at 8-9.
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Democrat-controlled General
130
Constitutional Convention.

Assembly

authorized

the

second

The second Constitutional Convention met from October 7, 1850, to
February 10, 1851.131 Among the one hundred fifty-four delegates to the
Convention, two-thirds were Democrats, and one-third Whigs. 13 2 In all,
fifty-six delegates were attorneys or were persons who had studied law,
were judges, or would become judges1 33
This lengthier second
Constitutional Convention allow the delegates to engage in considerable
debate, to articulate well-formed opinions, and to fashion constitutional
language that would reflect their collective will. 1 34 On August 4, 1851,
nearly seventy-five percent of Indiana voters approved the new
Constitution, 135 and the Constitution came into effect on November 1,
1851.136

In the Constitution of 1851, the delegates restricted the ability of the
state government to become indebted 137 and to engage in deficit
130 WILSON, supra note 74, at 100.
131 MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 68, at 10; WILSON, supranote 74, 101-02.
132 CARMONY, supra note 80, at 407; MADISON, supra note 67, at 139.
The precise
composition of the delegates was ninety-five Democrats and fifty-five Whigs.
KETFLEBOROUGH, supra note 127, at lxxxiii.
133 Brent E. Dickson, Thomas A. John, & Katherine A. Wyman, Lawyers and Judges as
Framersof Indiana's1851 Constitution, 30 IND. L. REV. 397, 397 (1997). As Justice Dickson has
noted, they "participated as equal partners with the other delegates from all walks of
Hoosier life in their grand quest for better government." Id.
134 WILSON, supranote 74, at 101. See generally REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1850
(2 vols. 1850) [hereinafter REPORT]; JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF INDIANA TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION (1851) [hereinafter JOURNAL].

135 McLAUCHLAN, supra note 68, at 11. The vote was 113,230 to 27,638. WILSON, supra
note 74, at 102.
136

MCLAUCI-ILAN, supranote 68, at 11.

137 IND. CONST. art. X. In 1881, the original Article XIII of the Indiana Constitution, which
had restricted the migration of slaves, negroes, and mulattoes, see infra footnotes 237-47 and
accompanying text, was replaced by a new Article XIII, which limited the ability of political
and municipal corporations to become indebted and reads as follows:
No political or municipal corporation in this State shall ever become
indebted, in any manner or for any purpose to an amount, in the
aggregate, exceeding two per centum on the value of the taxable
property within such corporation, to be ascertained by the last
assessment for State and county taxes, previous to the incurring of
such indebtedness; and all bonds or obligations, in excess of such
amount, given by such corporations, shall be void: Provided, That in
time of war, foreign invasion, or other great public calamity, on
petition of a majority of the property owners in number and value,
within the limits of such corporation, the public authorities, in their
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spending, 138 limited the state's ability to overcommit itself financially
139
mandated general laws,1 40
through ventures in banking and business,
141
prohibited special or local laws, and prohibited logrolling. 142 The new

discretion, may incur obligations necessary for the public protection
and defense to such amount as may be requested in such petition.
138 IND. CONST. art. X. In its original version, Article X provided as follows:
SEC. 1. The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a
uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all
property, both real and personal, excepting such only for municipal,
educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes, as may
be specially exempted by law.
SEC. 2. All the revenues derived from the sale of any of the public
works belonging to the State, and from the net annual income thereof,
and any surplus that may, at any time, remain in the treasury, derived
from taxation for general State purposes, after the payment of the
ordinary expenses of the government, and of the interest on bonds of
the State, other than bank bonds, shall be annually applied, under the
direction of the General Assembly, to the payment of the principal of
the public debt.
SEC. 3. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in
pursuance of appropriations made by law.
SEC. 4. An accurate statement of the receipts and expenditures of
the public money, shall be published with the laws of each regular
session of the General Assembly.
SEC. 5. No law shall authorize any debt to be contracted, on
behalf of the State, except in the following cases: to meet casual deficits
in the revenue; to pay the interest on the State dept; to repel invasion,
suppress insurrection, or, if hostilities be threatened, provide for the
public defense.
SEC. 6. No county shall subscribe for stock in any incorporated
company, unless the same be paid for at the time of such subscription;
nor shall any county loan its credit to any incorporated company, nor
borrow money for the purpose of taking stock in any such company;
nor shall the General Assembly ever, on behalf of the State, assume the
debts of any county, city, town or township, nor of any corporation
whatever.
139 IND. CONST. arts. X, XI.
For a discussion of Article XI, see infra note 179 and
accompanying text.
140 IND. CONST. art. IV, § 23. For a discussion of Article IV, sections 22 and 23, see infra
notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
141 IND. CONST. art. IV, §§ 22-23. For a discussion of Article IV, sections 22 and 23, see
infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
142 IND. CONST. art. IV, § 19. Article IV, section 19 in its original version provided as
follows: "Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected
therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced
in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much
thereof as shall not be expressed in the title." Id. In its current version, it provides: "An
act, except an act for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined
to one subject and matters properly connected therewith." Id.
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Constitution provided for biennial sessions of sixty-one days for the
General Assembly. 43 With these provisions and others, the framers
attempted to address several of the key problems under the Constitution
144
of 1816 and limit the power of the General Assembly.
The very first declarations by the framers in the 1851 Constitution
demonstrate the confluence of these currents in legal, political, and
religious thought and history and reflect their common understanding of
the Indiana Constitution. The framers declared in the Preamble:
TO THE END, that justice be established, public order
maintained, and liberty perpetuated; WE, the People of
the State of Indiana, grateful to ALMIGHTY GOD for
the free exercise of the right to choose our own form of
145
government, do ordain this Constitution.
Article I, section I added:
WE DECLARE, That all men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their CREATOR with certain
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the
People; and that all free governments are, and of right
ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted
For the
for their peace, safety, and well-being.
advancement of these ends, the People have, at all times,

143 IND. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (readings as adopted "The sessions of the General Assembly

shall be held biennially at the capital of the State, commencing on the Thursday next after
the first Monday of January, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-three, and
on the same day of every second year thereafter, unless a different day or place shall have
been appointed by law. But if, in the opinion of the Governor, the public welfare shall
require it, he may at any time by proclamation, call a special session.").
'44 CARMONY, supra note 80, at 410-23, 434-40,450-51; McLAUCHLAN, supra note 68, at 11.
145 IND. CONST. Preamble (1851). The Preamble to the 1816 version of the Indiana
Constitution provided in part as follows:
We the Representatives of the People of the Territory of Indiana,
...in order to establish Justice, promote the welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity; do ordain and
establish the following constitution or form of Government, and do
mutually agree with each other to form ourselves into a free and
Independent state, by the name of the State of Indiana.
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Together, these provisions express certain basic elements drawn
from the natural law tradition and the social contract theory, blended
with ideas that flourished in the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian eras, and
energized by religious sentiments that grew during the religious
awakening of the early nineteenth century. Created equal, possessing
natural rights, and acting as sovereigns over their government, the
people would ordain their own Constitution and freely exercise their
right to choose their own form of government.
Understood in its historical, religious, and philosophical context,
equality did not mean that all humans are the same in terms of natural
abilities, characteristics, talents, or virtues.1 47 The value of equality
meant that humans equally possess natural rights as creatures of God.
The value of equality also had a certain normative quality, establishing
standards by which laws, conventions, and conduct would be evaluated
and compelling the government through its laws to treat individuals

IND. CONST. art. I, § 1. Article I, sections 1 and 2 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816
provided as follows:
SEC. 1. That the general, great and essential principles of liberty
and free Government may be recognized and unalterably established;
WE declare, That all men are born equally free and independent, and
have certain natural, inherent, and unalienable rights; among which
are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of acquiring,
possession, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.
SEC. 2. That all power is inherent in the people; and all free
Governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their
peace, safety and happiness. For the advancement of these ends, they
have at all times an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter or
reform their Government in such manner as they may think proper.
147 In the founding era, John Adams wrote: "Was there, or will there ever be a nation
whose individuals were all equal, in natural and acquired qualities, in virtues, talents, and
riches? The answer in all mankind must be in the negative." MCCULLOUGH, supra note 44,
at 377 (quoting John Adams). Adams recognized that humans exhibit many inequalities in wealth, education, family position, and such-notwithstanding the moral and political
equality of rights and duties in America. Id. Notwithstanding the recognition in early
America that equality did not mean "sameness," the notion of equality could be
understood to describe some essential way in which all humans are equals. See generally
JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A WESTERN
INSIGHT (1999).

146
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with equal respect and to consider the claims of individuals equally. 48
Just six years after the new Indiana Constitution was ratified, Abraham
Lincoln, a favorite son of Indiana, 149 expressed these sentiments well in
his speech on the Dred Scott v. Sandford15° decision by the United States
Supreme Court:
The authors of that notable instrument [the Declaration
of Independence]... did not intend to declare all men
equal in all respects. They did not mean to say all were
equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or
social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness,
in what respects they did consider all men created
equal-equal in "certain inalienable rights, among which
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This they
said, and this they meant. They did not mean to assert
the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying
that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it
immediately upon them. In fact they had no power to
confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the
right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as
circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a
standard maxim for free society, which should be
familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to,
constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly
attained, constantly approximated,
and thereby
constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and
augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people
51
of all colors everywhere.'
III.

EQUALITY IN THE INDIANA CONSTITUTION

The best reflection of the framers' and ratifiers' conception of
equality is the text of the Indiana Constitution itself. Within the
constitution are provisions that recognize the basic equality of all

The Author is indebted to Professors John E. Coons and Patrick M. Brennan and their
thoughtful examination of the descriptive and normative senses of equality in BY NATURE
14

EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A WESTERN INSIGHT (1999).

Although born in Kentucky, Lincoln had grown up in Indiana, moving to Illinois with
his family when he was twenty-one years of age. PECKHAM, supra note 74, at 47-48, 69.
150 60 U.S. (2 How.) 393 (1957).
151 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in 2 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 398, 405-06 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953).
149
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individuals, thereby describing individuals as equals in certain essential
ways, and provisions that mandate the government to treat individuals
equally.
A. Provisions Expressing the Basic Equality of Indiana Citizens
The essential equality of all human beings is expressed
unequivocally in the first provision of the Indiana Constitution after the
Preamble. As their first declaration regarding the rights of Indiana
citizens, the framers proclaimed:
WE DECLARE, That all men 152 are created equal; that they
are endowed by their CREATOR with certain
unalienable 153 rights; that among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent
in the People; and that all free governments are, and of
right ought to be, founded on their authority, and
instituted for their peace, safety, and well-being. For the
advancement of these ends, the People have, at all times,
an indefeasible right to alter and reform their
government1 54
In Article I, section 1, the framers drew upon the Declaration of
Independence of 1776, of which Thomas Jefferson was the primary
author.1 55 Inspired by the words and the philosophy behind the

The present version of Article I, section 1 substitutes the term "people" for "men."
IND. CONST. art. I, § 1 (amended November 6, 1984).
153 The present version of Article I, section 1 reads "inalienable"
rather than
"unalienable."
154 Article I, sections 1 and 2 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided as follows:
SEC. 1. That the general, great, and essential principles of liberty
and free government may be recognized, and unalterably established:
WE DECLARE, That all men are born equally free and independent, and
have certain natural, inherent, and unalienable rights; among which
are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of acquiring,
possession, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.
SEC. 2. That all power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their
peace, safety, and happiness. For the advancement of these ends, they
have, at all times, an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter or
reform their government in such manner as they may think proper.
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, §§ 1-2.
155 REPORT, supra note 134, at 952-64 (discussing this language from the Declaration of
Independence); BURNS & PELTASON, supra note 9, at 31.
152
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Declaration of Independence, the framers of the Indiana Constitution
began the Indiana Bill of Rights with a declaration of the basic equality of
all individuals, the inalienability of rights, the locus of power and
authority in the people, and the right of the people to reform their
government.
Certain delegates opposed this provision, but the
proponents of the provision prevailed.
In their debate regarding this provision, the delegates to the
Convention highlighted what these words were intended to convey. In
discussing Article I, section 1, Delegate William M. Dunn of Jefferson
County argued:
The first part of this section expresses that sentiment
which occupies so prominent a place in our Declaration
of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness." To this sentiment I cling with fondness of
affection which has been so beautifully expressed by
[Delegate Rariden]. It has revolutionary associations. It
was made by the fathers of the republic, and comes
down to us hallowed by the memory of their long and
arduous struggles to maintain it. In the "unanimous
declaration of the thirteen United States of America," we
find the first authoritative enunciation ever made of the
great principle that all men are created free and equal.
The oppressed of every nation received the
announcement with joy and hope. They have repeated
it from one to another until it has become the watchword of liberty throughout the world. Wherever there is
now a man struggling for liberty, his heart swells with
emotion as he repeats this sentiment, and turns his eyes
to the Republic of the west as affording the world an
example of freedom and equality-of a government
instituted and sustained by the consent of the governed.
Under the influence of this principle thrones have
crumbled to the dust, and despots have been compelled
to relax the bonds of their subjects. It has not yet
fulfilled its destiny, nor will it until universal liberty
prevails throughout the earth.
And shall we now
discard this principle which our fathers proclaimed
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defiantly in the face of the most powerful nation on the
globe, and for the support of which they cheerfully
endured all the privations and calamities of a protracted
war? Shall we strike it in disgrace from our bill of
rights? I trust not, sir. Let us give to this sentiment the
first place in our bill of rights, that our children and our
children's children may early learn it, and cherish it in
their hearts as one of the fundamental principles of our
government.
[Delegate Pettit] says very truly, that the existence of
slavery in our country is inconsistent with this
declaration, and that our practices give the lie to all our
professions on the subject of freedom and equality. Our
fathers felt this inconsistency, but they boldly
proclaimed what they believed to be the true principle of
government, trusting that in time slavery would cease to
exist, and with it this gross inconsistency. The history of
those times and the debates in the Convention that
formed the Constitution of the United States, show that
the men of the Revolution looked upon slavery as a
temporary institution-one that circumstances beyond
our control had established among us-but one that must
fall before the advancing progress of Christianity and
philanthropy. Let us cherish the same hopes, and let us
not accommodate the declaration of our principles to the
existence of slavery, but let us rather earnestly labor in
every way we properly can, for the removal of the
inconsistency that stares us in the face, by the removal of
slavery itself.156
Delegate Robert Dale Owen of Posey County, one of the sons of
Robert Owen who founded Owen community, speaking as Chairman of
the Committee on Rights and Privileges, explained the Committee's
actions on Article I, section 1:
Among the "inalienable rights of all men"-black
and white-there is no distinction- is the right of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property. Now,
sir, it is quite clear, that if we prevent negroes, under any

156

REPORT, supranote 134, at 956-57.
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circumstances, from coming into this State, or from
holding real estate, we have no right to put such a
declaration as this into our Constitution; until that
matter is decided one way or the other, common
consistency requires that we should refrain from
reporting the section....
I will say for myself, that there was another
subject -I do not know that it had influence with other
members of the Convention, but it had great weight
with me - that in regard to the property of married
women, which, as it has not, at the time of the report,
been acted upon, seemed to me to require that we
should postpone the reporting of this section. When we
employ, in a Constitution, the words "all men," we use
the term "men" in a general sense. We include both
sexes. As, for example, when we say: "All men have a
natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences."
This, of course, guaranties liberty of conscience to
women, as well as men. So when we say: "All men
have an inalienable right to enjoy, possess, and protect
property," the declaration extends to women as well as
to men. Now, unless we change the old principle of the
common law, which merges, in the husband, the legal
existence of the wife, women, during the entire period of
their married life-and that is their usual conditionhave no more active or available rights, to acquire, or to
enjoy, or to protect property, than the negro slave has.
Unless, therefore, we change that principle, we have no
right to insert in our Constitution any such declaration
as that contained in the section under consideration. As
to one-half of the white citizens of this State, that
declaration is an absolute falsehood. 5 7
1:

Delegate John B. Howe of LaGrange County said of Article I, section

[Delegate Pettit] contended that the proposition that
all men are born equally free and independent is not

157

Id. at 957-58
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true. In the sense in which he uses the words, he is
undoubtedly correct; but with his intellect certainly he
ought to have been able to approximate to the meaning
which existed in the mind of the immortal author of
these words when he first committed them to paper. In
the sense of Jefferson and the framers of the Declaration
of Independence, the assertion is true, and always will
be true. The assertion refers to the rights of man as
existing under the law of nature; and by that law, in
contra-distinction to the law of man, all men are born
equally free. That is the way in which the term "men" is
used.
It does not require a grammarian to know that men
are not "born" in the sense in which [Delegate Pettit]
used the term. All know that this "man" is a generic
term, including the whole human race, and refers
undoubtedly to the time of their birth. It simply declares
that all men are born free, and that by the law of man,
and usurpation alone, they have become enslaved. That
is the meaning precisely, and nothing more nor less.
The objection that slavery now exists has nothing
whatever to do with the matter. Now we all know -for
we have all both heard and read -what is the origin of
slavery. Is slavery legitimate by the law of nature or of
man? Can you hold slaves by the law of nature? Every
schoolboy will respond "no" to the question, and tell
you that it exists only by usurpation. The words,
therefore, are not only true, but beautifully true; and as
an abstract proposition it is eminently just. As I said
before, I care very little whether it is retained in the new
Constitution or not. It will be equally true whether we
adopt it or reject it. But inasmuch as our ancestors have
seen proper to adopt these words, and inasmuch as they
were in the mouth of every freeman of the country at the
time, and have become nationalized, and immortalized
by the circumstances under which they were written, I
think we ought to retain them. There certainly can be no
impropriety in doing so; but, on the contrary, I regard
them as manifestly proper. If there be one political
document that has been given to immortality more than
Nothing
another, it is precisely that Declaration.
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whatever in all Grecian or Roman times can possibly
excel this in classic purity or excellence. Let us then
adopt it.
And let me now refer for a moment to an argument
used by [Delegate Owen] that these words conflict with
the section in regard to the rights of women.
Now we are not going to determine by this article
what the laws of nature are. I have said that by the laws
of nature all men are equally free and independent; that
by the laws of nature every one, whether man or
woman, is entitled to the first fruits of his industry and
his possessions. By the law of nature the savage who
first builds and occupies a hut is entitled to it; but when
he enters into society he must conform to the rules and
regulations which that society may adopt; and the mere
fact that by marrying a woman her property is thereby
transferred to her husband, is nothing more nor less
than transferring the property as it were by deed. She is
not compelled to marry. It is usually with her a matter
of choice. It is a contract like all other contracts so far as
property is concerned; and when she marries she
transfers her property to her husband by the law of the
land. But what, let me ask, has this to do with the laws
of nature. I may as well say that whether these words
are good or not, whether they are right or not, no
argument which I have heard against them has shown to
me their impropriety; but, on the contrary, the very
absurdity of the arguments made use of shows to me
their truth and excellence. 158
Although the framers recognized the equality of all men under the
natural law, it is a regrettable historical reality that the framers and
ratifiers of the Indiana Constitution of 1851 created inconsistencies by
including provisions that contradicted the value of equality that they
affirmed for themselves. Now, the equality and liberty that white men
were recognized to possess in the early years under the Constitution
exteare understood to be possessed by all persons, regardless of race,
national origin, or gender.

158

Id. at 959.
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B.

ProvisionsMandating the Equal Treatment of Indiana Citizens

1.

Equal Treatment in the Recognition of Basic Rights and Freedoms

In Article I of the Indiana Constitution, the Indiana Bill of Rights, the
framers recognized a broad range of rights that all Hoosiers possess.
These rights are equally possessed by all Hoosiers, and the Constitution
obligates the government to treat Indiana citizens equally in their
exercise of these rights. In recognizing these rights, the framers in many
provisions expressly limited the government's power to burden the
enjoyment of these rights by all people.
a.

As to the Rights to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuitof Happiness

In Article I, section 1, the framers recognized that all Hoosiers "are
endowed by their CREATOR with certain unalienable rights," including
the rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 159 Just a few
years after the framers adopted this language, the Indiana Supreme
Court wrote:
[T]he legislature cannot forbid and punish the doing of
that which the constitution permits; and cannot take
from the citizen that which the constitution says he shall
have and enjoy. If it can, then we think all will admit
that the constitution itself is worthless, the liberties of
the people a dream, and our government as despotic as
any on earth.

The first section of the first article declares, that all
men are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness. Under our constitution, then,
we all have some natural rights that have not been
surrendered, and which government cannot deprive us
of, unless we shall first forfeit them by our crimes; and

IND. CONST. art. I, § 1. Article I, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided
in part: "[All] men... have certain natural, inherent, and unalienable rights; among which
are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." IND. CONST. of
1816, art. 1, § 1.
159
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to secure to us the enjoyment of these rights, is the great
end and aim of the constitution itself.
It thus appears conceded that rights existed anterior
to the constitution -that we did not derive them from it,
but established it to secure to us the enjoyment of them;
and it here becomes important to ascertain with some
degree of precision what these rights, natural rights, are.

We lay down this proposition, then, as applicable to
the present case; that the right of liberty and pursuing
happiness secured by the constitution, embraces the
right, in each compos mentis individual, of selecting
what he will eat and drink, in short, his beverages, so far
as he may be capable of producing them, or they may be
within his reach, and that the legislature cannot take
away that right by direct enactment. If the constitution
does not secure this right to the people, it secures
nothing of value. If the people are subject to be
controlled by the legislature in the matter of their
beverages, so they are as to their articles of dress, and in
their hours of sleeping and waking. And if the people
are incompetent to select their own beverages, they are
also incompetent to determine anything in relation to
their living, and should be placed at once in a state of
pupilage to a set of government sumptuary officers;
eulogies upon the dignity of human nature should cease;
and the doctrine of the competency of the people for
self-government be declared a deluding rhetorical
flourish. If the government can prohibit any practice it
pleases, it can prohibit the drinking of cold water. Can it
do that? If not, why not? If we are right in this, that the
constitution restrains the legislature from passing a law
regulating the diet of the people, a sumptuary law, (for
that under consideration is such, no matter whether its
objects be morals or economy, or both,) then the
legislature cannot prohibit the manufacture and sale, for
use as a beverage, of ale, porter, beer, etc., and cannot
declare those manufactured, kept and sold for that
purpose, a nuisance, if such is the use to which those
articles are put by the people. It all resolves itself into
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this, as in the case of printing, worshipping God, etc. If
the constitution does not protect the people in the right,
the legislature may probably prohibit; if it does, the
legislature cannot. We think the constitution furnishes
160
the protection.
b.

16
As to the Freedom of Religion, and the Rights of Every Conscience 1

In Article I, section 2, the framers recognized that "[a]ll men 162 shall
be secured in the natural right to worship ALMIGHTY GOD, according
63
to the dictates of their own consciences."
Now on October 30, 1850, the Committee on Rights and Privileges
recommended the following version: "All men shall be secured in the
natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God, according to
the dictates of their own consciences." 164 On December 4, 1850,
considering the committee report, Delegate Michael G. Bright of

Herman v. State, 8 Ind. 545, 554-559 (1855) (internal citations omitted). Nearly a
century later, the Supreme Court of Indiana again considered the meaning of this
provision, recognizing that these rights are enjoyed by everyone:
However, the personal liberty clause, Art. 1, § 1 of the
Constitution of Indiana, or the right to pursue any proper vocation, is
regarded as an unalienable right and a privilege not to be restricted
except perhaps by a proper exercise of the police power of the state.
Liberty as used in the constitution not only means freedom from
servitude and restraint, but embraces the right of every one to be free
in the use of their powers in the pursuit of happiness in such calling as
they may choose subject only to the restraints necessary to secure the
common welfare. The privilege of contracting is both a liberty and a
property right and is protected by the constitution of both the state and
nation.
Kirtley v. State, 227 Ind. 175, 179-80, 84 N.E.2d 712, 714 (1949) (citations omitted).
161 Article I, section 3 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided in part:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; That
no man shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of
Worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent: That no
human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with
the rights of conscience: ...and no religious test shall be required as a
qualification to any office of trust or profit.
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 3.
162 The present version of Article I, section 2 substitutes "people" for "men." IND. CONST.
art. I, § 2 (amended November 6, 1984).
163 The First Article of the Ordinance of 1787 stated: "No person demeaning himself in a
peaceable and orderly manner shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or
religious sentiments, in the said territory." THE ORDINANCE OF 1787 § III, art. 1 (1787).
164 JOURNAL, supra note 134, at 165.
160
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Jefferson County sought to amend the proposed language by striking
"shall be secured in" and inserting the word "possess," 165 and Delegate
William C. Foster of Monroe County proposed adding the words
"possess and" after "men." 166 In the floor debate regarding whether the
provision would read "all men possess" or "all men shall be secured,"
Delegate Bright declared:
We are now on the bill of rights, and all that we aim at is
a declaration of rights. Among other rights, we propose
to say that all men are born free and equal, and that all
power is inherent in the people. Then comes the section
under consideration, declaring that all men possess the
natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of their own consciences. As it
is reported, it provides that "all men shall be secured."
Now how are they to be secured? We do not propose to
dictate future security to the people. We say that it is an
inherent right now-not a right that is to be hereafter
legislated upon and secured to them. They possess it
now. It is a mere declaration of abstract right; and it
seems to me, that, instead of saying we shall be secured
in that right, we ought to make the declaration that we
posses it now, and at all times, and that it cannot be
67
interfered with.1
Delegate Owen, the Chairman of the Committee, disagreed with
Delegate Bright, believing that the section already declared that the right
existed, but that it was important that "its existence shall be secured to
all men." 68 Delegate Owen argued:
No Legislature could ever refuse to secure to the people
this right without a manifest violation of the
Constitution.... We provide here in our organic law
that all men shall be secured in the right to worship
Almighty God, &c. We intended by this that they
should be so secured, and it will be the duty of the
Legislature to enact such laws as will prevent any and

165 Id. at 350.
166

Id.

167 REPORT, supra note 134, at 965-66.
16

Id. at 965.
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every religious society from being disturbed in their
169
worship.
Delegate James W. Borden of Allen, Adams, and Wells counties agreed
with Delegate Bright, urging, "Suppose that the Legislature should have
a majority which was not disposed to allow the right to be enjoyed....
We want to have it declared that we 'possess' the right." 17° Delegate
John B. Howe of LaGrange County responded:
[I]n the name of common sense, why assert the
notorious truth, that all men in this country, and in
every other country, have a right to worship Almighty
God as they please? If you assert anything at all,
therefore, why not assert that they shall be secured in
that right? I feel satisfied that you cannot insert a more
appropriate term. What does it mean? It means, that,
inasmuch as all men have a right to worship God
according to their own creed, they shall be protected in
that right. For example, if their meetings should be
wantonly disturbed, that the creating of such
disturbance should be regarded as a criminal offense,
and punished accordingly. The object of the provision
is, that the law should recognize the right and protect it
by proper legislation; that is all. It is simply tying up the
hands of the Legislature so that they cannot decree
171
otherwise.
Delegate Cromwell W. Barbour of Vigo County added:
The term "natural and indefeasible right" is an
acknowledgment that we possess it. The very terms
used in the section show that we possess the right, and
why, therefore, should we repeat the same thing in the
section. It appears to me that the section not only says
that all men possess the right, but it goes a step further,
and says that they shall be secured in it. I think there
can be no objection to the phraseology as it now stands.

169

Id.

170

Id.

177

Id.
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If the right is "natural and indefeasible," of course we
possess it.172
When this provision was referred to the Committee on Revision,
Arrangement, and Phraseology on December 5, 1850, it read: "All men
shall be secured in the natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences." 173
When the provision came back from that Committee on February 1, 1851,
it was in its final form: "All men shall be secured in the natural right to
worship ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the dictates of their own
consciences." 174
Article I, section 3 declares that "[n]o law shall, in any case whatever,
control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere
with the rights of conscience." In a resolution adopted on October 22,
1850, the Committee on Rights and Privileges was "directed to inquire
into the expedience of incorporating the following section in Article 1 of
the Constitution":
That the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
opinions and worship without discrimination or
preference, shall always be allowed in this State to all
mankind, and no person shall be rendered incompetent
to be a witness on account of his opinions on religious
belief; but that liberty of conscience, hereby secured,
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of this State. 175
On October 30, 1850, the Committee on Rights and Privileges
recommended that the provision read that "[n]o law shall, in any case
whatever, control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions,
or interfere with the rights of conscience," 176 which was the version
adopted by the Convention.
In this provision the framers restricted governmental power by
prohibiting any law that would control the free exercise and enjoyment

172 Id. at 966.
173 JOURNAL, supra note 134, at 867.
174 Id. at 871.
175 Id. at 120-21.
176 Id. at 165-66.
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of religion opinions or that would interfere with any individual's rights
of conscience. The scope of protection under this provision is broad,
extending to practices, beliefs, and conscience. By prohibiting any law
that would invade these protected domains, the protection would extend
not only to every individual but also to every group.
In Article I, section 4, the framers mandated that "[nlo preference
shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of
worship; 177 and no man 178 shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support,
any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent."
The "no preference" clause mandated equal treatment as to creeds,
religious institutions, and modes of worship. Thus, through its laws, the
government may not prefer any particular creed, any particular religious
group, or any particular mode of worship.
The "consent" clause provides additional protections as to the
conscience of every individual. When it comes to matters of religion, the
government must respect every individual's conscience and beliefs and
must not compel any person to attend, support, or maintain any religion,
religious institution, or ministry. To safeguard the conscience, consent is
a prerequisite. Similarly, in Article I, section 6, the framers restricted
government power to fund religious institutions. Thus, the framers
declared in Article I, section 6: "No money shall be drawn from the
treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

177

IND. CONST. art. I, § 4 (amended 1984). Article I, section 3 of the Indiana Constitution

of 1816 provided in part: "no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious
societies, or modes of worship ....
" IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 3. On October 30, 1850,
the Committee on Rights and Privileges recommended the following language: "No
discrimination shall be made by law between religious societies, nor preference be given by
law to any mode of worship." JOURNAL, supra note 134, at 165-66. On December 4, 1850,
Delegate John Pettit of Tippecanoe County moved to insert the terms "or sects" after
"worship." Id. at 349. Delegate John S. Newman of Wayne County sought to replace the
Committee's proposal with the following: "No preference shall be given by law to any
religious societies or modes of worship or creeds, and no religious test shall be required as
qualification to any office of trust or profit." Id. at 349. The following language was
referred to the Committee on Revision, Arrangement, and Phraseology on December 5,
1850: "No preference shall be given by law to any religious societies, or modes of worship,
or creeds, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification to any office of trust or
profit." Id. at 867. On February 1, 1851, this portion of Article I, section 4 read that "[no
preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of worship,"
which was the version adopted by the Convention. Id. at 871.
178 The present version of Article I, section 4 substitutes the term "person" for "man."
IND. CONST.art. I, § 4 (amended November 7, 1984).
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In Article I, sections 5, 7, and 8, the framers adopted additional
religious liberty protections for all Hoosiers. In Article I, section 5, the
constitution mandated that "[nmo religious test shall be required, as a
qualification for any office of trust or profit." Article I, section 7
mandated that "[n]o person shall be rendered incompetent as a witness,
in consequence of his opinions on matters of religion." In Article I,
section 8, the framers demonstrated sensitivity to matters of conscience
by requiring that "[t]he mode of administering an oath or affirmation,
shall be such as may be most consistent with, and binding upon, the
conscience of the person, to whom such oath or affirmation may be
administered." 179
c.

As to the Freedom of Expression

In Article I, section 9, the framers required that "[n]o law shall be
passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or
restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject
whatever; but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be
responsible."18 0 In this provision, the framers prohibited the government
from restraining Hoosiers in their expression of their thoughts and
opinions and from restricting Hoosiers in their right to speak, write, and
print on any subject. By broadly prohibiting any law restraining or
restricting the freedom of expression enjoyed by Hoosiers, the
government cannot prefer some speaking, writing, printing, or
expression over others.

Article XI, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided: "The manner of
administering an oath or affirmation shall be such as is most consistent with the conscience
of the deponent, and shall be esteemed the most solemn appeal to God." IND. CONST. of
1816, art XI, § 4.
180 Article I, section 9 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided:
That the printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes
to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch of
government; and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right
thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of
the invaluable rights of man; and every Citizen may freely speak,
write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that
liberty.
19

IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 9.
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d. As to Every Individual'sParticularServices and Property
In Article I, section 21, the framers required: "No man's181 particular
services shall be demanded without just compensation; no man's
property shall be taken by law; nor, except in case of the State, without
such compensation first assessed and tendered." 182 By this provision, the
framers prohibited the government from placing a burden on any person
by requiring that person to provide particular services or by taking such
person's property without just compensation.
In the debate regarding the meaning of the term "particular
services," Delegate Othniel L. Clark of Tippecannoe County stated, "I
take it that the word particular, in the old Constitution, means, not that
general service which every citizen is bound to render, but something
specific - something that is required of him as an individual, in
183
contra-distinction to what is required, generally, of all citizens."
Delegate John B. Niles of LaPorte County argued, "I prefer the old word
particular to the word personal used by the committee, as it will
distinguish between such services and those general services which all
good citizens owe to the State in protecting the interests and preserving
the good order of society." 184 Delegate Clark reiterated, "[t]here are

181 The present version of Article I, section 21 reads "person" rather than "man." IND.
CONST. art. I, § 21 (amended November 6,1984).
182 Article I, section 7 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided: "That no man's
particular services shall be demanded, or property taken or applied to public use, without
the consent of his representatives, or without a just compensation being made therefore."
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 1.
183 REPORT, supra note 134, at 359. Soon after the Convention, the Supreme Court of
Indiana considered the meaning of "particular services" in the context of witness fees in
criminal matters, stating:
[W]e are prepared to say, that the services of witnesses in criminal
cases are not particular, but are of the class of general services which
every man in community is bound to render for the general, as well as
his own individual good. It is as much the duty and interest of every
citizen to aid in prosecuting crime as it is to aid in subduing any
domestic or foreign enemy; and it is equally the interest and duty of
every citizen to aid in furnishing to all, high and low, rich and poor,
every facility for a fair and impartial trial when accused; for none is
exempt from liability to accusation and trial. These are matters of
general interest and public concern, are vital, indeed, to the very
existence of free government, and render the services of witnesses on
such occasions matters of general public interest, and not particular, in
the sense of the constitution.
Israel v. State, 8 Ind. 467, 468 (1856).
184 REPORT, supra note 134, at 368.
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duties which all citizens are occasionally called on to perform; services
which the necessities of the State demand alike from all; obligations
which all citizens owe to their Government, the common defense of
all."185 Thus, the framers required a measure of equal treatment when
the government demands individual citizens to provide their particular
services or yield their property to the government.
e.

As to the Right to Contract

In Article I, section 24, the framers instructed that "[n]o ... law
impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed." 186 By
restricting governmental exercises of its police powers, this provision
protects the contractual rights of all citizens from governmental
intrusion.

f

As to the Right to Assemble and Instruct Representatives

In Article I, section 31, the framers mandated: "No law shall restrain
any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a
peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; nor from
instructing their representatives; nor from applying to the General
Assembly for redress of grievances." 187 In recognizing the rights of all
Indiana inhabitants to assemble peaceably and to consult for their
common good, the framers concomitantly restricted the government's
power to restrain any inhabitant from exercising these rights, as well as
their rights to instruct their representatives and to apply to the state
legislature for redress of grievances.
All inhabitants, including
individual persons and groups, are protected in their enjoyment of the
rights recognized in this provision.

185

Id. at 371-72.

186 Article I, section 18 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided in part: "[N]or any
law impairing the validity of contracts, shall ever be made .
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. 1,
§ 18.
187 Article I, section 19 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided: "That the people
have a right to assemble together, in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common
good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of
grievances." IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 19.
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g. As to the Right to Bear Arms
In Article I, section 32, the framers provided that "[t]he people shall
88
have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State."
In recognizing this right, the framers recognized that every Hoosier
possessed this right.
h.

As to Emigration

In Article I, section 36, the framers mandated that "[e] migration from
the State shall not be prohibited. " 189 In proscribing any prohibition on
emigration from Indiana, the framers recognized a right that could be
exercised by any person.
i. As to Slavery and Involuntary Servitude
A free state from its inception, Indiana prohibited slavery and
involuntary servitude in Article I, section 37: "There shall be neither
slavery, nor involuntary servitude, within the State, otherwise than for
the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted. No indenture of any Negro or Mulatto, made and executed
out of the bounds of the State, shall be valid within the State." 190 In
addition to proscribing slavery and involuntary servitude, the framers,
as to slaves and indentured servants residing in Indiana, invalidated the
obligations made and executed outside of Indiana.
2.

Equal Treatment in the Administration of Justice in Indiana Courts

In Article I, section 12, the framers established principles that would
govern the administration of civil and criminal justice in Indiana. They

Article I, section 20 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided: "That the people
" IND. CONST. of
have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and the state ....
1816, art. I, § 20.
189 Article I, section 23 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided: "That emigration
from the state shall not be prohibited." IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 23.
190 Article XI, section 7 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided:
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in this state,
otherwise than for punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted. Nor shall any indenture of any negro or mulatto
hereafter made, and executed out of the bounds of this state, be of any
validity within the state.
IND. CONST. of 1816, art XI, § 7. Article I, section 37 presently provides as follows: "There
shall be neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude, within the State, otherwise than for the
punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." IND. CONST. art.
1, § 37 (amended November 6,1984).
188

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss2/8

DeBoer: Equality as a Fundamental Value in the Indiana Constitution

2004]

Equality as a Fundamental Value

declared: "All courts shall be open; and every man, 191 for injury done to
him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without
purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without
delay." 192 In governing the civil and criminal justice systems, the three
clauses in this provision mandate equality of treatment.
Although the "open courts" clause did not identify for whom the
courts shall be open, the "remedies" clause completed the idea, ensuring
that every person would have remedy by the due course of law for
injury to his or her person, property, or reputation. The "justice" clause
mandated that the justice administered by Indiana courts be
characterized by certain qualities. The clause providing that justice shall
be administered "freely, and without purchase" ensured that courts
would not be influenced to treat parties differently based upon financial
The clause providing that justice shall be administered
factors.
"completely, and without denial" ensured that all parties would receive
all of the justice they are entitled to under the law and would not be
denied what they are due. The clause providing that justice shall be
administered "speedily, and without delay" ensured that courts would
not extend special treatment as to how quickly justice is done. The
cumulative effect of Article I, section 12 is that Indiana courts must treat
persons equally in their administration of justice.
3.

Equal Treatment in Legislative Enactments

a.

As to Privileges or Immunities

In Article I, section 23, the framers declared that "[t]he General
Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or
immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens." 193 This provision regulated the treatment of citizens by the

The present version of Article I, Section 12 reads "person" rather than "man." IND.
CONST. art. I, § 12 (amended November 6,1984).
19
Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided: "That all Courts
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or
reputation, shall have remedy by the due course of law; and right and justice administered
without denial or delay." IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 11.
193 This provision predates that Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
191
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General Assembly and required the government to distribute privileges
or immunities equally.
Delegate Daniel Read of Monroe and Brown counties proposed the
1 94
substance of Article I, section 23 at the Constitutional Convention.
Delegate Read was strongly opposed to laws under which the state
undertook extensive internal improvements, laws involving state funds
in banking, and laws lending state credit or trust funds to
corporations. 195 He was concerned about the state granting exclusive
privileges and thereby creating monopolies and about the state
196
partnering with some citizens to the exclusion of others.
At the Convention, Delegate Horace P. Biddle of Cass County, who
would become an Indiana Supreme Court justice, stated:
[T]he proposition is a plain one, that there shall be no
exclusive monopolies-no privilege granted to one man
which shall not, under the same circumstances, belong
to all men.
It is a sound judicial principle, that may be applied
safely and justly to the rights of all men. This principle
leaves men of capital precisely where it leaves men in
their natural condition- equal. If the majority of this
Convention will not grant to all men equal rights, let
them vote against the proposition. If they do not desire
to leave the road of capital, of skill, of enterprise, of
talent, of industry, of worth, open alike to every citizen
of Indiana, let them vote against it. And if gentlemen on
this floor, in the middle of the nineteenth century, wish
to declare before the world that all men are not created

process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, the federal provision prohibits states from denying
equal protection of the laws, while the Indiana provision explicitly involves the granting of
privileges or immunities.
194 JOURNAL, supra note 134, at 575; REPORT, supra note 134, at 1385, 1393.
195 Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind. 1994) (quoting 1 JAMES ALBERT WOODBURN,
HISTORY OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY 1820-1902, 191 (1940)).
196

Id.
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with equal rights, then, I say again, let them vote against
197
this proposition.
Delegate Abel C. Pepper of Ohio and Switzerland Counties explained
that "[t]he section proposed by [Delegate Read], is intended to prohibit
the Legislature from establishing monopolies, or granting special
privileges.' 98 Delegate Othniel L. Clark of Tippecanoe County indicated
that the proposal "provides that if the Legislature grants to one set of
persons a privilege, it shall grant the same privilege to all other persons.
If they grant a privilege to a corporation, they shall grant the same
privilege to all other persons who ask for the privilege."' 99 Thus, by
prohibiting the General Assembly from granting privileges or
immunities to any citizen or class of citizens that it does not equally
grant to all citizens, this provision requires equality of treatment.
b.

As to Local or Special Laws

In Article IV, the legislative article, the framers sought to remedy
some of the key problems that arose under the 1816 Constitution. One of
the most troublesome issues involved the General Assembly enacting
laws addressing local and special matters. Delegate John Pettit of
Tippecanoe County insisted that "[local legislation] is the whole error the whole incongruity -the whole oppression of our law, and almost the
whole necessity of calling this Convention, was to do away with this
local legislation.... All that is most necessary is to have uniformity in
2°°
our laws."
In section 22 of Article IV, the framers wrote:
The General Assembly shall not pass local or special
laws, in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to
say: Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of Justices of
the peace and constables; For the punishment of crimes
and misdemeanors; Regulating the practice in courts of
justice; Providing for changing the venue in civil and
criminal cases; Granting divorces; Changing the names
of persons; For laying out, opening and working on
highways, and for the election or appointment of

19

REPORT, supra note 134, at 1394.

198
199

Id. at 1395.

200

Id. at 1771.

Id. at 1397.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 [2004], Art. 8

544

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW

[Vol.38

supervisors; Vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys
and public squares; Summoning and empanelling grand
and petit jurors, and providing for their compensation;
Regulating county and township business; Regulating
the election of county and township officers, and their
compensation; For the assessment and collection of taxes
for State, county, township or road purposes; Providing
for supporting common schools, and for the
preservation of school funds; In relation to fees or
salaries; In relation to interest on money; Providing for
opening and conducting elections of State, county, or
township officers, and designating the places of voting;
Providing for the sale of real estate belonging to minors
or other persons laboring under legal disabilities, by
201
executors, administrators, guardians or trustees.
Rather than legislating on matters of local or special concern, the framers
mandated that the General Assembly focus its legislative attention on
matters of general concern. Thus, in Article IV, section 23, they insisted:
"In all the cases enumerated in the preceding section, and in all other
cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be
general, and of uniform operation throughout the State."

Article IV, section 22 presently reads as follows:
The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws:
Providing for the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors;
Regulating the practice in courts of justice; Providing for changing the
venue in civil and criminal cases; Granting divorces; Changing the
names of persons; Providing for laying out, opening, and working on,
highways, and for the election or appointment of supervisors; Vacating
roads, town plats, streets, alleys, and public squares; Summoning and
empaneling grand and petit juries, and providing for their
compensation; Regulating county and township business; Regulating
the election of county and township officers and their compensation;
Providing for the assessment and collection of taxes for State, county,
township, or road purposes; Providing for the support of common
schools, or the preservation of school funds; Relating to fees or salaries,
except that the laws may be so made as to grade the compensation of
officers in proportion to the population and the necessary services
required; Relating to interest on money; Providing for opening and
conducting elections of State, county, or township officers, and
designating the places of voting; Providing for the sale of real estate
belonging to minors or other persons laboring under legal disabilities,
by executors, administrators, guardians, or trustees.
IND. CONST. art. IV, § 22 (amended March 14, 1881 and November 6, 1984).

201
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In Article IV, section 24, the framers provided for the General
Assembly to enact general legislation providing for suits against the
state, but forbade special laws authorizing particular suits or
compensating individuals for damages: "Provision may be made, by
general law, for bringing suit against the State, as to all liabilities
originating after the adoption of this Constitution; 202 but no special act
authorizing such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any
person claiming damages against the State, shall ever be passed." 2 3 By
mandating laws of general and uniform application, and restricting the
ability to pass local or special legislation, the framers restricted the
ability of the General Assembly to engage in unequal treatment as to
specific individuals, groups, or localities.
c.

As to Titles and HereditaryDistinctions

Reflecting similar language found in the United States
Constitution,2 4 in Article I, section 35, the framers prohibited "[tlhe
General Assembly ... [from] grant[ing] any title of nobility, nor
confer[ring] hereditary distinctions." 20 5 This provision reiterated the
framers' commitment to the equality of all individuals. The General
Assembly may not designate citizens variously or distinguish among
citizens so that some citizens would receive titles of nobility or some
other distinction because of their birth.
d.

As to the Penal Code

In Article I, section 18, the framers set forth the basic philosophy that
must govern the General Assembly's enactment of the penal code -the
penal code must "be founded on the principles of reformation, and not
of vindictive justice." 206 By so directing, this provision counseled the

The phrase "as to all liabilities originating after the adoption of this Constitution" has
been removed from the present version of Article IV, section 24. IND. CONST. art. IV, § 24
(amended November 6, 1984).
203
The term "act" changed to "law." IND. CONST. art IV, § 24 (amended November 6,
1984).
204
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States").
205
Article I, section 22 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided: "That the
Legislature shall not grant any title of nobility, or hereditary distinctions, nor create any
office, the appointment to which shall be for a longer term than good behaviour." IND.
CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 22.
206
Article IX, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided in part:
It shall be the duty of the general assembly, as soon as
circumstances will permit, to form a penal code, founded on the
202
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legislature to enact a penal code that aims to reform offenders, rather
than one designed to seek revenge or that does not seek the restoration
of those convicted. Thus, although offenders by their illegal conduct
distinguish themselves from the rest of the citizenry and thus justify
different treatment by the government, this provision tempers the
treatment by the General Assembly of those who violate the state's laws.
e.

As to Education

When it came to the Indiana system of public education, the framers
mandated a general and uniform system that would be equally open or
available to all. In Article VIII, section 1, they wrote:
Knowledge and learning, general diffused throughout a
community, being essential to the preservation of a free
government; it should be the duty of the General
Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral,
intellectual, scientific and agricultural improvement; and
to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of
Common Schools, wherein tuition shall be without
20 7
charge, and equally open to all.

principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice: ... on such
principles, that such persons may therein, find employment, and every
reasonable comfort, and lose, by their usefulness, the degrading sense
of dependence.
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. IV, § 4.
207 Article IX, sections 1 and 2 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided:
Knowledge and learning generally diffused through a
SEC. 1.
community, being essential to the preservation of a free government,
and spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through
the various parts of the country being highly conducive to this end, it
shall be the duty of the general assembly, to provide by law for the
improvement of such lands as are, or hereafter may be granted by the
United States, to this state, for the use of schools, and to apply any
funds which may be raised from such lands, or from any other
quarters, to the accomplishment of the grand object for which they are
or may be intended.... The general assembly shall from time to time,
pass such laws as shall be calculated to encourage intellectual,
scientifical, and agricultural improvement, by allowing rewards and
immunities for the promotion and improvement of arts, sciences,
commerce, manufactures, and natural history; and to countenance and
encourage the principles of humanity, industry, and morality.
SEC. 2. It shall be the duty of the general assembly, as soon as
circumstances will permit, to provide by law, for a general system of
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Four years after the constitution was ratified, Justice Hovey, who served
as a convention delegate, wrote that this provision was intended to avoid
certain evils of the old system: "inequality in education, inequality in
taxation, lack of uniformity in schools, and a shrinking from legislative
responsibilities." 2°8
f

As to Property Taxes

When it came to the Indiana property tax system, uniformity and
equality also mattered to the framers. Thus, in Article X, section 1, they
mandated: "The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such
regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property,
2 9
both real and personal." 0
Delegate Daniel Read of Monroe and Brown counties proposed the
substance of Article X, section 1. At the Convention, he argued:
[N]o provisions are more proper for a Constitution, than
those requiring equality of assessment for purposes of
taxation. The duty of the legislature to devise a system
which will secure such equality and which will cause all
the property of the State to be brought under taxation,
should be held forth in the Constitution. 210
He also urged:
I have noticed that the Governors of our State in the
annual messages for a number of years past, have called
attention of the Legislature, and the people of the State
at large, to the great inequality of assessment and
taxation as existing under our laws. In many parts of the
State the subject has excited much attention.... There is

education ascending in a regular gradation from township schools to a
state university, wherin tuition shall be gratis, and equally open to all.
IND. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2.

The Northwest Ordinance provided in part:

"Religion,

morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."
2D Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 557, 563 (1855).
209 Article X, section 1(a) presently provides as follows: "The General Assembly shall
provide, by law, for a uniform and equal rate of property assessment and taxation and shall
prescribe regulations to secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and
personal...." IND. CONST. art X, § 1 (amended November 8, 1966).
210 REPORT, supra note 134, at 941.
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manifest injustice in permitting property in the hands of
the wealthy, which ought to be taxed as other property,
to escape taxation altogether, or to be taxed only on a
211
very small part of its value.
He added:
I do not suppose ... that these inequities can be
corrected by the Constitution, nor even wholly by the
laws. But I would lay down the rule in the Constitution.
It will be in the minds of the people. It will be before the
Legislature. It will strengthen those who wish to secure
a system of just and equal taxation. The rule will be a
part of the organic law, and the people and the
legislature will endeavor to work up to a rule so
manifestly just and equitable. If the rights of society are
to be equal - if men are to stand upon the same
platform, if none are to enjoy special privileges or
exemptions which others do not enjoy, let the rule
requiring it go into the Constitution. Whatever else we
omit, let us not omit a principle so fundamental in its
character, and lying at the very foundation of free
212
government.
Although six and a half decades after the Convention, Governor
Samuel Ralston expressed the enduring meaning of this provision on
January 7, 1915, when he addressed the General Assembly and argued
that the words "uniform and equal" should not be removed from Article
X, section 1:
[Article X, section 1] provides for a system of taxation
that is "uniform and equal." I like these words. They
appeal to man's innate sense of justice, and it would
seem that they should have a permanent place in a
government founded in a love for justice, and especially
it seems they are most appropriate on which to rest that
greatest function of government, the power to lay and
213
collect taxes.

211

Id. at 946.

212

Id.

213

2 KETILEBOROUGH, supra note 127, at §§ 532, 588.
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14
As to Corporations,Banks, and Moneyed Institutions2

In advance of the 1850-51 Convention, the State of Indiana found
itself in trouble financially after it had established banks and undertaken
considerable debt. To remedy this problem, Article XI limited the state's
involvement in the banking business. In establishing these limitations,
the framers withdrew certain powers, prohibited special legislation as to
financial institutions, and mandated general and uniform treatment:
Section 1. The General Assembly shall not have power
to establish or incorporate any bank or banking
company, or moneyed institution, for the purpose of
issuing bills of credit, or bills payable to order or bearer,
except under the conditions prescribed in this
Constitution.
Section 2. No banks shall be established otherwise than
under a general banking law, except as provided in the
fourth section of this article.
Section 3. If the General Assembly shall enact a general
banking law, such law shall provide for the registry and
countersigning, by an officer of State, of all paper credit
designed to be circulated as money; and ample collateral
security, readily convertible into specie, for the
redemption of the same in gold or silver, shall be
required, which collateral security shall be under the
control of the proper officer or officers of State.

Article X, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided in part:
There shall not be established or incorporated, in this state, any bank
or banking company or moneyed institution, for the purpose of issuing
bills of credit, or bills payable to order or bearer: Provided,that nothing
herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent the general
assembly from establishing a state bank, and branches, not exceeding
one branch for any three counties, to be established at such place,
within such counties, as the directors of the state bank may select; ...
Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be so construed, as to
prevent the general assembly from adopting either of the aforesaid
banks as the state bank: And in case either of them shall be adopted as
the state bank, the other may become a branch, under the rules and
regulations herein before prescribed.
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 1.
214
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Section 13. Corporations, other than banking, shall not
be created by special act, but may be formed under
general laws.
4.

Equal Treatment in the Enforcement of Criminal Laws

In the Bill of Rights, the framers also recognized a number of rights
that apply to those accused of committing crimes. Through these
provision, the framers ensured that these rights and protections would
apply equally to citizens who were being investigated, prosecuted, or
incarcerated by the government. Together these provisions require
equality of treatment.
Certain of these provisions restrict the government's power when it
enforces the law. In Article I, section 11, the framers protected Hoosiers
against unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search
or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
215
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
This provision established important protections of Hoosiers from
unreasonable searches and seizures of their person or property by the
government and mandated that warrants satisfy certain requirements.
Article I, section 24 required that "[n]o ex post facto law.., shall ever be
passed." 216 Thus, the constitution prevented the government from
punishing a person for conduct made illegal after that person had
217
already engaged in the conduct.

Article I, section 8 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided:
The rights of the people, to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 8.
216
Article I, section 18 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided in part: "No ex post
facto law ... shall ever be made...." Id. at art. I, § 18.
217 Thomas Jefferson decades earlier had commented on the injustice of ex postfacto laws:
"Every man should be protected in his lawful acts, and be certain that no ex postficto law
shall punish or endamage him for them." Thomas Jefferson to Issac McPherson, 1813, in 13
215
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In Article I, sections 13 and 14, the framers provided a number of
protections for all who are accused of committing crimes and facing
criminal prosecution:
Section 13. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury,
in the county in which the offense shall have been
committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process for
218
obtaining witnesses in his favor.
Section 14. No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for
the same offense. No person in any criminal prosecution
21 9
shall be compelled to testify against himself.
The framers also provided certain protections for every person
detained or incarcerated by the government:
Section 15. No person arrested, or confined in jail, shall
be treated with unnecessary rigor.

THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326 (Lipscomb & Bergh eds., Memorial ed. 1903-04).

He added:
The sentiment that ex post facto laws are against natural right is so
strong in the United States that few, if any, of the State constitutions
have failed to proscribe them. The Federal Constitution indeed
interdicts them in criminal cases only; but they are equally unjust in
civil as in criminal cases, and the omission of a caution which would
have been right, does not justify the doing what is wrong.
Id. at 327.
218 Article I, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided in part:
That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right to be heard
by himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the
witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor; and in prosecutions by indictment or
presentment, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offence shall have been committed ....
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 13.
219 Article I, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided in part: "That in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused ...shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself, nor shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence." IND.CONST. of 1816, art. I,
§ 13.
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Excessive bail shall not be required.
Section 16.
Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual
punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be
220
proportioned to the nature of the offense.
Section 27. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended, except in case of rebellion or
221
invasion; and then, only if the public safety demand it.
Regardless of how heinous the offense, the framers set limits regarding
the government's treatment of a person accused or convicted of
committing a crime. By preserving the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the framers ensured that those detained or incarcerated by the
government would have the ability to challenge the lawfulness of their
detention or imprisonment.
C. ProvisionsAllowing Exceptions to the Equal Treatment of Indiana Citizens
Although the framers typically mandated equality, generality, and
uniformity of treatment as to individuals and institutions, the framers
The framers
created certain exceptions within the constitution.
recognized these exceptions to promote certain policy interests or to
respond to a unique concern that reverberated throughout America in
the nineteenth century.""

Article I, sections 14, 15, and 16 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided:
SEC. 14. That all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless
for capital offences, when the proof is evident, or the presumption
great ....
SEC. 15. Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not
be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
SEC. 16. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the
offence.
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, §§ 14-16.
"[T]he
221 Article I, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided in part:
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety may require it." IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 14.
222 In addition to the exceptions to equal treatment recognized in the Constitution, the
Constitutional Convention also considered resolutions and petitions regarding the rights of
women. Delegate Owen introduced the following resolution at the Constitutional
Convention:
That women hereafter married in this State shall have the right to
acquire and possess property, to their sole use and disposal; and that
laws shall be passed, securing to them, under equitable conditions, all
property, real and persona, whether owned by them before marriage,

220
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The Right to Vote

Although the framers mandated in Article II, section 1 that "[a]ll
elections shall be free and equal," 223 the framers did not extend the right
to vote to every Hoosier, only to white male citizens meeting the
requirements set forth in Article II, section 2:
In all elections, not otherwise provided for by this
Constitution, every white male citizen of the United
States, of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who

or acquired afterwards, by purchase, gift, devise or descent, and also
providing for the registration of the wife's separate property.
Journal, supra note 134, at 30. A resolution was introduced by Delegate William Steele of
Wabash County that a "provision be incorporated in the Constitution of the State of
Indiana to instruct our representatives to provide by law the right of petition to all white
females of the age of eighteen and upwards to the Indiana Legislature for such laws as will
tend to protect their best interest and that of their posterity." Id. at 48. Delegate Milroy
submitted a resolution providing:
That it be referred to the committee on the rights and privileges of
the inhabitants of this State, to enquire into the expedience of adding
another section to our present bill of rights, to read as follows: Women
who may enter into the married state from and after the ratification of
this Constitution by the people, shall not lose or forfeit any legal rights
by said marriage.
Id. at 70-71. Delegate Borden submitted the following resolution:
That there be incorporated in the Constitution the principle, that
the real and personal estate of every female acquired before marriage,
and all property to which she may afterwards become entitled by gift,
grant, inheritance or devise, shall be and remain the separate estate
and property of such female, and shall not be liable for the debts,
obligations, or engagements of her husband; and may be aliened,
devised, or bequeathed by her as if she were unmarried.
Id. at 77. Delegate Owen submitted the following resolution:
That the committee on rights and privileges of the inhabitants of
the State inquire into the expedience of incorporating in the bill of
rights, the following section: Women hereafter married in this State
shall have the right to acquire and possess property, to their sole use
and disposal; and laws shall be passed, securing to them, under
equitable conditions, all property, real and personal, whether owned
by them before marriage, or acquired afterwards, by purchase, gift,
devise or descent, and also providing for the registration of the wife's
separate property.
Id. at 101-02. Citizens of Dearborn County submitted a petition on the subject of the rights
of married women. Id. at 676. Women of Henry County submitted a petition on the rights
of married women. Id. at 820. However, the Constitutional Convention did not ultimately
approve any of these proposed provisions. See id. at 905-06.
m Article I, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided: "That elections shall
be free and equal." IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 4.
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shall have resided in the State during the six months
immediately preceding such election; and every white
male, of foreign birth, of the age of twenty-one years and
upwards, who shall have resided in the United States
one year, and shall have resided in this State during the
six months immediately preceding such election, and
shall have declared his intention to become a citizen of
the United States, conformably to the laws of the United
States on the subject of naturalization, shall be entitled to
vote in the township or precinct where he may reside. 224
Article II, section 2 was amended over time to extend the votingfranchise to all
races and both genders.
2.

The Practice of Law

In Article VII, section 21, the framers provided that "[elvery person
of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to
Although this provision on its
practice law in all courts of justice." 2
face recognized the right of every voter to practice law, Article II limited
the right to vote to certain white males. In 1893, the Indiana Supreme
Court, considering among other authorities two equality provisions in
the Indiana Bill of Rights, ruled that Article VII, section 23 does not
exclude women, and that women are entitled to practice law.22 6 Article
VII, section 21 was repealed on November 8, 1932.

224 Article II, section 2 presently provides: "A citizen of the United States, who is at least

eighteen (18) years of age and who has been a resident of a precinct thirty (30) days
immediately preceding an election, may vote in that precinct." IND. CONST. art. II, § 2
(amended March 14, 1881; September 6, 1921; November 2, 1976; November 7, 1984;
November 3, 1998). The voting franchise was extended to all races in 1881, to each gender
in 1921, and the voting age was lowered to eighteen in 1976. In 1921, the provision
extending the right to vote to non-citizens who intended to become Indiana citizens was
removed in 1921. McLAUCHLAN, supra note 68, at 64.
225 This provision was repealed on November 8, 1932.
In re Leach, 34 N.E. 641, 64243 (Ind.1893) (citing Article I, §§ 1, 23).
226
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227
The Establishment of Certain State Institutions

The framers placed duties upon the General Assembly to provide
institutions for the education of those who have disabilities affecting
hearing, speaking, and seeing, for the treatment of the mentally ill, and
for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders. Article IX
provided:
Section 1. It shall be the duty of the General Assembly
to provide, by law, for the support of Institutions for the
education of the Deaf and Dumb, and of the Blind; and
also for the treatment of the Insane.228
Section 2. The General Assembly shall provide Houses
of Refuge, for the correction and reformation of juvenile
offenders. 229
Section 3. The county boards shall have power to
provide farms, as an asylum, for those persons who, by
reason of age, infirmity, or other misfortune, have claims
upon the sympathies and aid of society.230
As to these individuals, the framers determined that the General
Assembly should enact special laws for their benefit.

227 Article IX, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution of 1816 provided:
It shall be the duty of the general assembly, as soon as
circumstances will permit, to form a penal code, founded on the
principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice: And also to
provide one or more farms, to be an asylum for those persons who, by
reason of age, infirmity, or other misfortunes, may have a claim upon
the aid and beneficence of society, on such principles, that such
persons may therein find employment, and every reasonable comfort,
and lose, by their usefulness, the degrading sense of dependence.
IND. CONST. of 1816, art. IX, § 4.
228 The present version has been rephrased, referring to "the deaf, the mute, and the
blind." IND. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (amended November 6, 1984). Although the handicapped
and mentally ill had few resources in the first several decades of Indiana history, the
General Assembly established a school for deaf and mute children, and another for the
blind, and a hospital for the mentally ill in the 1840s. MADISON, supra note 67, at 131.
Notwithstanding this exhibition of humanitarian sentiment and sense of responsibility for
the care of such individuals, such efforts were not matched by significant commitment of
public resources. Id.
2
The present version refers to "institutions" rather than "houses of refuge." IND.
CONST. art. IX, § 2 (amended November 7, 1984).
230 In the present version, the provision refers to "counties" and has changed the verb to
"may provide." Id. (amended November 6, 1984).
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Property Taxes

Although the framers mandated equality and uniformity as to
property taxes, they allowed the General Assembly to exempt certain
property used for certain purposes from the property tax system. Under
Article X, section 1, the General Assembly was to provide for a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and property taxation, as for both real and
personal property, "excepting such only for municipal, educational,
literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes, as may be specially
exempted by law." 231 Thus, the framers and ratifiers of the Indiana
Constitution allowed special treatment as to property devoted to certain
purposes favored by public policy.
5.

232
Black Suffrage and Migration

Although the framers and ratifiers of the Indiana Constitution
believed in equality and promoted that value throughout the 1851
Constitution, they exhibited a profound contradiction when it came to
233
matters of race, escaped slaves, and migration by African-Americans.
In 1850, the population of Indiana numered 988,416, but the number of
African-Americans was just over 11,000.234 During the middle third of
the nineteenth century, some Hoosiers assisted escaped slaves as they
fled slave states on the underground railroad, portions of which ran
through Indiana, and participated in the establishment and activities of
anti-slavery societies. 235
However, many Hoosiers were troubled
regarding the migration of African-Americans, and considered

231 Article X, section 1 presently provides in part:
(a) ....
The General Assembly may exempt from property
taxation any property in any of the following classes: (1) Property
being used for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or
charitable purposes; (2) Tangible personal property other than
property being held for sale in the ordinary course of a trade or
business, property being held, used or consumed in connection with
the production of income, or property being held as an investment; (3)
Intangible personal property. (b) The General Assembly may exempt
any motor vehicles, mobile homes, airplanes, boats, trailers or similar
property, provided that an excise tax in lieu of the property tax is
substituted therefor.
Ind. Const. art. X, § 1 (amended November 8, 1966).
232 This provision was repealed and replaced by a provision on municipal debt on March
14, 1881.
233 CARMONY, supra note 80, at 442-50; PEcKHAM, supra note 74, at 65-68.
234

MADISON, supra note 67, at 168-69.

235 Id. at 107.
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colonization in the African republic of Liberia and other means of
removing blacks from the nation. 236 As one historian has written, in
pioneer Indiana, few Hoosiers "believed in the equality of the races or
made efforts to improve the unfortunate lot of many African Americans,
237
slave or free."
Acting upon these concerns and prejudices, the framers of the 1851
Constitution failed to treat African-Americans with equality. In Article
II, section 5, they deprived African-Americans of the right to vote. 238 In
Article XIII, 239 the framers required special treatment for those AfricanAmericans who would migrate to Indiana and mandated the General
Assembly to enact laws enforcing these provisions:
Section 1. No negro or mulatto shall come into, or settle
in, the State, after the adoption of this Constitution.
Section 2. All contracts made with any negro or mulatto
coming into the State, contrary to the provisions of the
foregoing section, shall be void; and any person who
shall employ such negro or mulatto, or otherwise
encourage him to remain in the State, shall be fined in
any sum not less than ten dollars, nor more than five
hundred dollars.
Section 3. All fines which may be collected for a
violation of the provisions of this article, or of any law

236 Id. The Indiana Colonization Society was found in 1829. Id. Even among anti-slavery,
colonization was considered as an option. PEcKHAM, supra note 74, at 66. The morality and
wisdom of colonization as well as the motivations behind this proposal were widely
debated among individuals, churches, anti-slavery groups, and other social groups.
MADISON, supra note 67, at 107. A variety of laws were hostile to African-Americans, and
both of the Indiana Constitutions prohibited them from voting. Id.
237 Id.
238 This provision stated that "[n]o Negro or Mulatto shall have the right of suffrage."
IND. CONST. art. II, § 5 (repealed March 14, 1881).
239 Article XIII passed with a 93 to 40 vote. MADISON, supra note 67, at 169. A number of
delegates recognized the contradiction to basic legal values and their Christian faith and
voiced opposition to this Article, and one delegate declared that Article XIII was "'an
"' Id. (quoting EMMA Lou
outrage upon all the principles of our boasted institutions ..
THORNBROUGH, THE NEGRO IN INDIANA: A STUDY OF A MtNoRrrY 66-67 (1957)). When this
Article was separately submitted to the Indiana electorate for a vote, the vote in favor of
this Article was more than overwhelming than with the delegates. Id. John B. Howe of
LaGrange County argued that the Article should be deleted because the Article "is not only
opposed to the fundamental principles of liberty, justice, and equality, but . . . it is in
defiance of the Constitution of the United States itself." CARMONY, supra note 80, at 443.
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which may hereafter be passed for the purpose of
carrying the same into execution, shall be set apart and
appropriated for the colonization of such negroes and
mulattoes, and their descendants, as may be in the State
at the adoption of this Constitution, and may be willing
to emigrate.
Section 4. The General Assembly shall pass laws to
carry out the provisions of this article. 240
Providently, the inequalities of the black suffrage and migration
provisions were ultimately corrected. In 1866, the Indiana Supreme
Court declared these provisions in Article XIII null and void because
they were repugnant to the United States Constitution in view of the
Civil War Amendments. 241 A decade and a half later, on March 14, 1881,
these provisions were formally repealed. Nevertheless, this blatant
contradiction remains conspicuous, and this page of Indiana's history
242
remains one of the state's most regrettable legacies.
IV.

RECENT APPLICATIONS BY THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT

Since the early 1990s, the Indiana Supreme Court has decided a
broad range of state constitutional cases that have vast implications for
equality and equal treatment under the law in Indiana. Together, these
decisions demonstrate that the value of equality continues to inspire,
instruct, and shape law and government in Indiana.

§§ 14.
Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299 (1866). For a survey of the Indiana Supreme Court's
slave cases and its persistent affirmations of basic human rights, see RANDALL T. SHEPARD,
240

IND. CONST. art. XIII,

241

FOR HUMAN RiGHTS: SLAVE CASES AND THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT, TRACES OF INDIANA
AND MIDWESTERN HISTORY 34 (2003); Sandra Boyd Williams, The Indiana Supreme Court and

the Struggle Against Slavery, 30 IND. L. REV. 305 (1997).
It is a lamentable aspect of Indiana history that, throughout the nineteenth and much of the
twentieth centuries, African-Americans in Indiana were subjected to considerable hostility and
violence and to widespread discrimination and prejudice on account of their race. MADISON, supra
note 67, at 169-73.
242
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A.

Protecting the Rights of All Indiana Citizens by Limiting Governmental
Police Power

1.

Freedom of Expression

In 1993, in Price v. State,243 the Indiana Supreme Court determined
that Article I, section 9 recognizes broad protection as to the right of
every individual to speak freely on any subject whatsoever, especially
when such speech is political speech. The court noted the framers'
perspective that the state's exercise of its police powers was designed to
facilitate the enjoyment of individual rights.244 In holding that the
government's restriction upon an individual's freedom of expression is
confined within certain constitutional limitations, the court declared:
[11n Indiana the police power is limited by the existence
of certain preserves of human endeavor, typically
denominated as interests not within the realm of the
police power, upon which the State must tread lightly, if
at all. Put another way, there is within each provision of
our Bill of Rights a cluster of essential values which the
legislature may qualify but not alienate. A right is
impermissibly alienated when the State materially
burdens one of the core values which it embodies. 245
Government action is considered a material burden upon a core
constitutional value "[i]f the right, as impaired, would no longer serve
the purpose for which it was designed." 246 The court thus established a
constitutional standard for evaluating government infringements upon
the rights of individuals protected by the Indiana Bill of Rights.
As to the larger meaning of Article I, section 9, the court stated that
the "substantive content" of this provision is "that popular comment on
public concerns should not be restrained." 247 The court found that, by
1850, the importance of free interchange on public affairs was wellaccepted and concluded that section 9 "enshrines pure political speech as
a core value."2 4 The court determined that, because the government

243 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind. 1993). Chief Justice Shepard wrote for the majority, and Justice
DeBruler and Krahulik concurred. Justices Dickson and Givan dissented.
244

Id. at 959.

245 Id. at 960 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
246
247
248

Id. at 960-61 n.7.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 963.
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may not punish expression if doing so imposes "a material burden upon
a core constitutional value," section 9 limits the government's authority
over expression to "sanctioning encroachments upon the rights of
individuals or interference with exercises of the police power." 249
2.

Freedom of Religion

In 2001, in City Chapel Evangelical Free, Inc. v. City of South Bend,250 the
court determined that the seven religious freedom provisions (Article I,
sections 2 through 8) broadly protect the right of every Indiana citizen to
worship and practice religion. Having determined that these provisions
should not be equated with those of their counterpart in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, 251 the court explained that
the framers and ratifiers of sections 2 and 3 did not intend to afford only
narrow protection for an individual's internal thoughts and private
practices of religion and conscience. 252 Rather, by protecting the rights to
worship according to the dictates of conscience, to exercise religious
opinion freely, and to act in accordance with conscience, sections 2 and 3
advance core constitutional values that restrain government interference
with the practice of religion, not simply in private, but also in
community with other persons. 25 3 Because the Indiana religious freedom
provisions advance core constitutional values, the government may not
materially burden these values.254
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that section 2, by
requiring that "all men shall be secured" in the right to worship, places a
249 Id. at 959-60.

250 744 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 2001). Justice Dickson wrote for the court, and Justice Rucker
concurred in his opinion in its entirety. Chief Justice Shepard joined in Justice Dickson's
Indiana constitutional analysis, but dissented as to his federal constitutional analysis.
Although Justice Boehm disagreed with Justice Dickson's determination, he expressed his
agreement with the Indiana constitutional analysis. Id. at 456 (stating that "the various
provisions ... prevent the State from imposing material burdens on the exercise of
religious practice" and that "this protection extends beyond the private devotion vel non of
individuals and also includes the public and group activities associated with religious
practices.").
251 Id. at 446 (stating that "[cilearly, the religious liberty provisions of the Indiana
Constitution were not intended merely to mirror the federal First Amendment. We reject
the contention that the Indiana Constitution's guarantees of religious protection should be
equated with those of its federal counterpart and that federal jurisprudence therefore
governs the interpretation of our state guarantees.").
252
Id. at 450.
253 Id. (utilizing the court's core constitutional analysis articulated in Price v. State, 622
N.E.2d 954 (Ind.1993)).
254 Id.
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duty upon the General Assembly to safeguard and secure this right
through its laws,255 and that section 3, by prohibiting any law "in any
case whatever" from controlling or interfering with this right,
demonstrates the intent to provide unrestrained protection for the
articulated values. 256
Considering the wide range of religions,
denominations, religious communities, and practices in Indiana by 1850,
the court observed that the respect of the framers and ratifiers for the
variety of religious opinions and practices was underscored by their
inclusion of section 7 (prohibitting rendering a witness incompetent
because of any religious opinion) and section 8 (directing that oaths or
affirmations be administered in a mode consistent with an individual's
conscience) in the Bill of Rights.257 Drawing insight from an 1893 Indiana
Supreme Court decision, the court observed that the religious liberty
provisions "take away all power of the state to interfere with religious
beliefs" and that, "'[i]n other words, the law allows every one [sic] to
believe as he pleases, and practice that belief so long as that practice does
not interfere with the equal rights of others. ' 258
In 2003, in Embry v. O'Bannon,259 a plurality of the Indiana Supreme
Court held that the state's dual-enrollment programs, under which
public school corporations received additional state funding for
providing various instructional services to private school students on
private school premises, did not violate Article I, section 6 of the Indiana
Constitution, which mandates that "[nlo money shall be drawn from the
260
treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."
The plurality determined that the dual-enrollment programs provide
educational benefits to Indiana children who apart from the programs
would not receive certain educational resources and training and that the

25 Id. at 447-48.
25 Id.
at 448.
257 Id. at 449.
2,
Id. (quoting Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361, 365, 33 N.E. 777, 779 (1893)).
-9 798 N.E.2d 157 (Ind. 2003). Justice Dickson, joined by Justice Rucker, wrote the
plurality opinion for the court. Chief Justice Shepard concurred in result. Justice Sullivan
in a separate opinion, joined by Chief Justice Shepard, concurred in the result of the
plurality opinion on the constitutional question whether the dual-enrollment programs
violated Article I, section 6. Justice Boehm concurred in the result of the plurality opinion,
writing that "expenditure of public funds for proper educational purposes is not 'for the
benefit of' a religious institution even if the delivery point of the educational services is a
parochial school," and that "the legislation involved in this case is constitutional because it
does not expend funds for the benefit of a religious institution." Id. at 169-70.
260 Id. at 167-70.
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programs benefit the State of Indiana by furthering its objective to
261
encourage education for all Indiana students.
The plurality noted that Indiana appellate courts had already
interpreted Article I, section 6 both to permit the state and its political
subdivisions to contract with religious organizations for goods or the
delivery of services, notwithstanding possible incidental benefit to the
institutions, and to prohibit the use of public funds only when used
directly for such institutions' activities of a religious nature. 262 Finding
that any benefits to parochial schools when the dual-enrollment
programs were, at most, relatively minor and incidental and that the
programs did not directly fund activities of a religious nature, the
plurality concluded that the dual-enrollment programs did not violate
Article I, section 6. Thus, the court approved the equal treatment and
use of religious organizations by the state and its subdivisions in the
provision of goods and delivery of services and the equal treatment of
Indiana school children in the provision of public educational services,
whether those children attend one of Indiana's public schools or one of
the many religious and private schools.
3.

Freedom of Contract

In 1991, in Clem v. Christole,263 the Indiana Supreme Court
determined that Article I, section 24, which prohibits any law impairing
the obligation of contracts, prevents the government from invading the
freedom of contract unless the government's exercise of its police powers
is necessary for the general public and reasonable under the
circumstances. 264 Recognizing that "[c]ontracts enable individuals to
order their personal and business affairs according to their particular
needs and interests," 26 5 the court concluded that this prohibition is
implicated when a law is retrospectively applied so that it interferes with
existing legal contracts under which rights have vested. 266 Although the
government may, in exercising its police powers, prohibit contracts that
are against public policy, if this police power exception is construed too
broadly, exercises of police power would eviscerate the constitutional

261 Id. at 167.

262 Id. at 164-65, 167 (discussing State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 28 N.E.2d 256 (Ind. 1940),
and Center Township of Marion County v. Coe, 572 N.E.2d 1350 (Ind.Ct. App. 1991)).
263 582 N.E.2d 780 (Ind.1991).
264 Id. at 784.
265 Id. (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spanaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978)).
266 Id. at 783-84.
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protection. 267 Thus, the court required a heightened standard to protect
the freedom of contract from legislation targeting certain existing
contracts and mandated that a statute invading the right can only be
sustained as a valid exercise of police power if the statute both relates to
the claimed objective and employs means that are reasonable and
26
appropriate to secure the objective. 8
B.

Ensuring Equal Treatment in the Criminal Justice System by Guarding
Against DisproportionatePenalties

In 1992, in Clark v. State 269 the Indiana Supreme Court recognized
that Article I, section 16, which mandates that "all penalties shall be
proportioned to the nature of the offense," provides a right to criminal
defendants to have the proportionality of their penalties reviewed under
the Indiana Constitution.270 Although a defendant's sentence may fall
within parameters affixed by the legislature, the court has a
constitutional duty to review the duration of that sentence to prevent
manifest injustice because it is possible for the statute to be
constitutional, but unconstitutional as applied to a particular criminal
defendant. 271 The court wrote:
There are cases to be found ...of defendants who have
been found guilty and imprisoned under valid statutes,
where courts of appeal have held such imprisonments to
be in violation of the Constitution, by reason of their
length, they being so severe and so entirely out of
proportion to the gravity of the offenses actually
committed as "to shock public sentiment and violate the
272
judgment of a reasonable people."
The court in 1993, in Conner v. State,273 added that this provision places
limitations on the government's ability to exact punishment for criminal
behavior. 274
Paradoxically, the practical effect of this line of

267 Id. at 783.
268 Id. at 784.

269 561 N.E.2d 759 (Ind.1990).
270 Id. at 765.
271 Id. Article VII, section 4 recognizes the Indiana Supreme Court's authority to review
and revise sentences in order to prevent manifest injustice. See Fointno v. State, 487 N.E.2d
140, 144 (Ind.1986).
272 Clark, 561 N.E.2d at 765 (quoting Cox v. State, 181 N.E. 469, 472 (Ind.1932)).
273 626 N.E.2d 803 (Ind.1993).
274

Id. at 806.
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constitutional precedent is that Indiana courts are to consider carefully
whether uniform and equal applications of criminal statutes result in
injustice and when appropriate to impose sentences that are carefully
fashioned to specific cases and particular criminal defendants.
C. Ensuring Equal Treatment in the Criminal Justice System by Protecting
Against Double Jeopardy
In 1999, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Richardson v. State,
interpreted the meaning of the term "same offense" contained in Article
I, section 14, which prohibits any person being "put in jeopardy twice for
the same offense." 275 The court concluded that the double jeopardy
protection under the Indiana Constitution extends to cases in which a
defendant, in one trial, faces prosecution and penalties for multiple
offenses. 276 The court also determined that the Indiana Constitution
requires courts, in considering whether a criminal defendant is being
convicted and sentenced for the "same offense," to look not simply at the
statutes under which a defendant is prosecuted, but also to the actual
evidence presented at trial, to ensure that each offense is established by
277
separate and distinct facts.
Mindful of the government's superior power and the vulnerability of
the accused, the court recognized that the double jeopardy protection
safeguards "the integrity of jury acquittals and the finality interest[s] of
[all] defendant[s], shields against excessive and oppressive prosecutions
[of criminal defendants], and ensure[s] that defendants will not undergo
the anxiety and expense of repeated prosecution and the increased
probability of conviction upon reprosecution." 278 Thus, the protection
against double jeopardy safeguards accused individuals against
potential abuse by the government when it singles out an individual for
prosecution.

275 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999). Justice Dickson joined by Chief Justice Shepard, wrote for
the court. Justice Sullivan concurred with a separate opinion. Justice Boehm, joined by
Justice Selby, concurred in result with a separate opinion.
276 Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 37 n.3, 43,49-55.
277 Id. at 49-50.
278

Id. at 37 n.3.
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D. Ensuring Equal Treatment by Prohibiting the State from Demanding
ParticularServices
In 1991, in Bayh v. Sonnenburg, the Indiana Supreme Court
determined that the Article I, section 21 prohibition against any person's
particular services being demanded without just compensation prevents
the government from requiring any individual to provide certain
services (such as those an individual performs to earn a living) that are
not required of all citizens. 279 However, this prohibition does not extend
to the various general services (such as testifying before a jury) that
every citizen is bound to render as part of the social compact. 280 In 2001,
the court held that this provision "prevents requiring a specific lawyer to
accept employment without compensation in a specific case, [that] the
obligation to provide pro bono service is one of the profession as a
whole, and [that] Article I, section 21 prevents a court from imposing this
obligation disproportionately on any single attorney." 281
E.

Ensuring Equal Treatment by Restricting the Granting of Unequal
Privileges and Immunities

In 1994, in Collins v. Day,282 the Indiana Supreme Court determined
that Article I, section 23, which prohibits laws granting unequal
privileges and immunities,
imposes two requirements upon statutes that grant
unequal privileges or immunities to differing classes of
persons. First, the disparate treatment accorded by the
legislation must be reasonably related to inherent
characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated
classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be
uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons
similarly situated. 283

279 573 N.E.2d 413 (Ind.1991).
280 Id. at 413, 416.
21 Sholes v. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d 156,162-64 (Ind.2001).
282 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994). Justice Dickson wrote for the court, and Chief Justice
Shepard, Justice DeBruler, and Justice Givan concurred. Justice Sullivan dissented without
opinion.
283 Id. at 80. The court established that this provision has independent meaning, separate
and distinct from Fourteenth Amendment and that the tiered-scrutiny analysis in federal
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence does not apply in the Indiana Equal Privileges and
Immunites analysis. Id. at 75.
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The court emphasized that "[tihe protections assured by Section 23 apply
fully, equally, and without diminution to prohibit any and all improper
grants of unequal privileges or immunities, including not only those
grants involving suspect classes or impinging upon fundamental rights
but other such grants as well." 284 In reaching this conclusion, the court
found that the framers' intent was "to prohibit the state legislature from
affirmatively granting any exclusive privilege or immunity involving the
state's participation in commercial enterprise," and not "to prevent
abridgement of any existing privileges or immunities, nor to assure
citizens the equal protection of the laws." 285
Having determined that the provision applies both to the granting of
special privileges and the imposition of special burdens and extends
beyond the state's involvement in commercial enterprise, 2 6 the court
identified several "recurrent themes" that provided the basis for its twopart test.28 7 First, when legislation
singles out one person or class of persons to receive a
privilege or immunity not equally provided to others,
[the] classification must be based upon distinctive,
inherent characteristics [that] rationally distinguish the
unequally treated class, and the disparate treatment
accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to
288
[those] distinguishing characteristics.
Second, "any privileged classification must be open to any and all
persons who share the inherent characteristics [that] distinguish and
justify the classification, with the special treatment accorded to any
particular classification extended equally to all such persons." 289 Third,
"courts must accord considerable deference to the manner in which the
legislature has balanced the competing interest involved." 290 The court
anticipated that Indiana's "independent state privileges and immunities
jurisprudence w[ould] evolve in future cases ...to assure and extend

2s

Id. at 80.

285 Id. at 77.
286 Id. at 77-78.
287 Id.

2'
Id. at 78-79. The court noted that this requirement thus incorporates and satisfies the
often expressed concerns that "legislative classifications be 'just,' 'natural,' 'reasonable,'
'substantial,' 'not artificial,' 'not capricious,' and 'not arbitrary.'" Id. at 79.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 79-80.
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protection to all Indiana citizens in addition to that provided by the
291
federal Fourteenth Amendment."
Since the Indiana Supreme Court issued its Collins decision, the
court's application of these equal privileges and immunities clauses have
varied, and the court's decisions have often been fractured opinions
regarding the meaning and application of the standards. In 1999, in
Martin v. Richey,292 the Indiana Supreme Court applied the Collins test
and determined that the two-year statute of limitations in the medical
malpractice act, as applied to the plaintiff, failed the second part of the
Collins test and thus violated the Indiana equal privileges and
immunities provision. 293 Under the second part of the Collins test,294 the
court determined that when applied to the plaintiff, a medical
malpractice claimant who could not discover her malpractice injury
within the two-year period, the statute of limitations was not uniformly
applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. 295
Thus, the court held that the "plaintiff [c]ould not be foreclosed from
bringing her malpractice suit when, unlike many other medical
malpractice plaintiffs, she could not reasonably be expected to discover
the asserted malpractice and resulting injury within the two-year period
given the nature of the asserted malpractice and of her medical
296
condition."
In 2000, in Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc., 297 the Indiana Supreme
Court again considered the statute of limitations in the medical

291 Id. at 81.

2M2 711 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind. 1999). Justice Selby wrote for the court, and Justices Dickson
and Boehm joined her opinion. Justice Sullivan concurred in result, but Chief Justice
Shepard wrote in dissent.
293 Id. at 1281-82.

294 As to the first part of the test, the court had already determined that the legislative
classification scheme, which distinguishes between victims of medical malpractice and
victims of other torts, or between health care providers and other tortfeasors, is reasonably
related to the goal of maintaining sufficient medical treatment and controlling malpractice
insurance costs, and therefore is not unreasonable." Id. at 1280-81 (citing Rohrabaugh v.
Wagoner, 413 N.E.2d 891, 894-95 (Ind. 1980); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d
585, 589-90, 604 (Ind. 1980)). The court reiterated that the "medical malpractice statute of
limitations rationally furthers the goal of controlling malpractice costs by encouraging the
prompt presentation of claims and ... limiting unfair exposure to defending health care
providers that stems from dimmed memories or the loss of evidence over time." Id.
295 Id. at 1281-82.
29 Id. at 1282.
297 730 N.E.2d 692 (Ind. 2000). Justice Boehm, joined by Chief Justice Shepard and Justice
Dickson, formed the majority. Justices Sullivan and Rucker in dissent argued that the
Martin decision dictated a result opposite the result reached by the Boggs majority.
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malpractice act and held that the statute of limitations was constitutional
as applied to the plaintiff because she became aware of her injury eleven
months before the statute of limitations expired and thus could have
filed her claim within the two-year statutory period. 298 Under the Boggs
decision, the statute of limitations is not unconstitutional as applied to
plaintiffs who are unable to learn of their injuries at the time of the
malpractice but who do in fact, or should, become aware of their injuries
well before the end of the limitations period. 299 According to the court,
"as long as the statute of limitations does not shorten the window of time
[for filing] so unreasonably that it [becomes] impractical for a plaintiff to
300
file a claim at all,... it is constitutional as applied to that plaintiff."
Also in 2000, in McIntosh v. Melroe Co., a plurality of the court upheld
the General Assembly's classification scheme in the statute of repose
provision of the product liability act. 30 1 For the plurality, the age of the
product, not claimants, was the basis for the different treatment under
the statute. 30 2 Thus, depending upon the age of the product at issue,
every Hoosier could potentially recover for or be barred from recovering
for an injury from the product. 30 3 In deferring to the legislature, the
plurality determined that the classification of products was rationally
related to legislative goals and constituted a permissible balancing of
3
policies. 04

298

Id. at 694.

299 Id. at 697.
300 Id.
301 729 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2000). Justice Boehm joined by Chief Justice Shepard wrote the

plurality opinion. Justice Sullivan concurred in part and concurred in result. Justice
Dickson, joined by Justice Rucker, dissented, arguing that the first part of the Collins test
has two sub-elements: "(a) such classification must be based upon distinctive, inherent
characteristics that rationally distinguish the unequally treated class; and (b) the disparate
treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to such distinguishing
characteristics." Id. at 991 (Dickson, J., dissenting) (quoting Collins v. Day, 664 N.E.2d 72,
79 (Ind.1994)). Justice Dickson, who authored the court's Collins opinion, explained that
although deference to the legislature is appropriate as to part 1(b) and part two of the
Collins test, it is not appropriate as to part 1(a); rather, courts must carefully review
legislative classifications. Id. at 993. For the dissent, the repose provision distinguishes two
classes of persons for unequal treatment, and because the legislative classification in the
repose provision is not based upon distinctive, inherent characteristics that rationally
distinguish the unequally treated classes and therefore arbitrarily breaks up a natural class,
the provision violates Article I, section 23. Id. at 993-94.
302 Id. at 981.
3W3

Id.

04

Id.
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In 2003, in Alliedsignal, Inc. v. Ott, the Indiana Supreme Court
revisited the statute of repose in the product liability act, considering a
challenge by a claimant wife whose husband died of lung cancer alleged
to have been caused by asbestos-containing products. 305 The court noted
that the act provides two different time limits that apply to asbestosrelated litigation. First, Indiana Code section 34-20-3-1 applies generally
to all product liability claims and establishes a two-year statute of
limitations and a ten-year statute of repose. 306 Second, Indiana Code
section 34-20-3-2 applies to at least some asbestos liability claims,
excepting certain asbestos-related actions from the operation of the tenyear statute of repose in section 34-20-3-1.307 When a product liability
action qualifies under section 34-20-3-2, no firm statute of repose arises,
and a different timetable applies.308 The court found that the more
favorable time period under section 34-20-3-2, a discovery-type accrual
of claim provision, only applies if the defendant is a person or entity that
3°9
mined and sold commercial asbestos.
The court held the repose provision in section 34-20-3-1 did not
violate the constitutional provision prohibiting the granting of unequal
privileges or immunities. 310
The court found that, although the
legislation created a distinction between asbestos victims and other
victims, the classification resulting from the distinction worked in the
favor of asbestos plaintiffs. 311 Considering that asbestos plaintiffs are
subject to the same statute of repose as other product liability claimants
with respect to all defendants other than persons who mined and sold
commercial asbestos, the court also determined that the plaintiff wife
and the asbestos plaintiffs generally do not suffer any cognizable harm
312
from the distinction.
Also in 2003, in Humphreys v. Clinic for Women, Inc.,313 a case
challenging the state's funding of abortions under Medicaid, the court
held: (1) that Article I, section 23 does not require the Indiana Medicaid

W5 785 N.E.2d 1068 (nd. 2003).
3o Id. at 1070-71.
307

Id. at 1071.

308
309
310

Id.
Id. at 1071-73.
Id. at 1077.

311

Id.

312

Id.

313 796 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. 2003). Justice Sullivan wrote the opinion.
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program to pay for all abortions that are medically necessary, 314 but (2)
that so long as the Indiana Medicaid program pays for abortions to
preserve the lives of pregnant women and where rape or incest causes
pregnancy, the program must also pay for abortions in cases of
pregnancies that create for pregnant women serious risk of substantial
and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function. 315 The court
emphasized that courts are to defer to the legislature as it exercises its
discretion and attempts to balance competing interests and to construe
statutes in a way as to further the purpose of the legislature without
316
offending the Indiana Constitution.
As to the first holding, the court found that, under the first prong of
the Collins test, the state could constitutionally refuse to pay for an
abortion for a Medicaid-eligible pregnant woman facing health risks but
choose to pay for an abortion when necessary to preserve the life of a
Medicaid-eligible pregnant woman or when the pregnancy was caused
by rape or incest.317 The court determined that the state's justifications
for the classification- namely, the unavailability of federal financial
participation, the interest in protecting fetal life, fiscal policy, and
administrative efficiency-were constitutionally sufficient and not
arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. 318 Under the second prong of the
Collins test, the court determined that the Indiana Medicaid program
pays for abortions for all persons in the classification of Medicaid-eligible
pregnant women seeking to terminate their pregnancies when necessary
to preserve their lives or when the pregnancy resulted from rape or
incest.

319

In its second holding, the court invoked the "as applied" doctrine to
reach its conclusion that, even though the statutory and regulatory
Medicaid program was constitutional on its face, it was unconstitutional
as applied to Medicaid-eligible pregnant women whose pregnancies
would create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a

Id. at 248-49, 253-57. Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Dickson concurred in this
holding in separate opinions. Id. at 260-64. Justice Boehm in a separate opinion, joined by
Justice Rucker, dissented as to this holding. Id. at 264-71.
315 Id. at 249, 257-59. Justice Boehm and Justice Rucker concurred in this holding. Id. at
260. Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Dickson dissented as to this holding in separate
opinions. Id. at 260-64.
316 Id. at 253.
317 Id. at 253-57.
318 Id. at 255-57.
319 Id. at 257.
314
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major bodily function.320 For the court, Medicaid-eligible pregnant
women whose pregnancies create serious risk of substantial and
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function were virtually
indistinguishable, in terms of characteristics, from Medicaid-eligible
pregnant women whose abortions are necessary to preserve their lives or
whose pregnancies were caused by rape or incest.321 Thus, the court
expanded the Indiana Medicaid program and found Article I, section 23
to require the state to pay for abortions sought by Medicaid-eligible
pregnant women whose pregnancies create serious risk of substantial
and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.
E. GuaranteeingEqual Treatment by Restricting Special or Local Laws
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Indiana in Municipal City of South Bend
v. Kimsey 322 reviewed its jurisprudence under Article IV, sections 22 and
23 regarding special and local legislation and clarified the constitutional
standards.323 The court recognized "that [a] statute is 'general' if it
applies 'to all persons or places of a specified class throughout the
state,"' 324 and that "a statute is 'special' if it 'pertains to, [operates upon,
benefits, or] affects a particular case, person, place, or thing, as opposed
' 325
to the general public. "'
The court articulated a two-part test for determining whether a
statute is an unconstitutional special or local law: (1) is the statute
special or general legislation?; 326 and (2) can a general law be made
applicable? 327 If legislation identifies a locality whether by name,
distinguishing characteristic, or otherwise, it is special legislation.328 For
a special or local law to be constitutional, the law must be reasonably
related to inherent characteristics of a locality that distinguish it from
other localities and justify special legislative treatment, and the law must
apply equally to other localities that share those characteristics. 329 If the
characteristics or conditions a law addresses are found in a variety of
places throughout the state, a general law can be made applicable, and

320 Id. at 257-59.
321 Id. at 258.

3- 781 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. 2003). Justice Sullivan dissented in a separate opinion.
323 Id. at 689
324 Id. at 687 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (7th ed. 1999)).

325
326
327
328

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

329

Id.

689 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 323, at 890.
689-90 (citing Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1070, 1085 (Ind. 2000)).
689-90, 694-96 (citing Williams, 724 N.E.2d at 1085).
692.
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thus a general law is required by Article IV. 330
331
special legislation is not permitted.
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In such an instance,

F. Ensuring Equal Treatment by Mandating a Uniform and Equal Rate of
PropertyAssessment and Taxation
In 1996, in Boehm v. Town of St. John,332 the Indiana Supreme Court
determined that Article X, section 1 mandates that equality, uniformity,
and just valuation characterize the property tax system established by
the General Assembly. 333 The court explained that, by establishing
certain minimum requirements for the property tax system, this
provision restricts the otherwise discretionary powers of the
legislature. 334 In adopting this provision, the framers "specifically
require[d] uniform and equal assessment and taxation, and just
valuation," and thereby "elevated and preserved the[] importance [of
these values] as fundamental principles." 335 Thus, "the great object of
[this provision] was to ensure that property taxes [alre imposed on all
forms of property wealth equally and uniformly [and] ...that each
taxpayer's property wealth bear its proportion of the overall property tax
burden."336 The court concluded:
Seeking to ensure that each taxpayer's property
wealth bear its proportion of the overall property tax
burden, the Indiana Constitution requires that our
property tax system achieve substantially uniform and
equal rates of property assessment and taxation and
authorizes the legislature to allow a variety of methods
337
to secure such just valuation.

330 Id. at 692-93.
331

Id. at 693.

332 675 N.E.2d 318 (Ind. 1996). Justice Dickson wrote for the majority, and Justices
Sullivan and Selby concurred. Chief Justice Shepard dissented, believing that the uniform
and equal assessment and taxation provision requires a system of assessment based on
actual market value. Id. at 328-29 (Shephard, J., dissenting). Justice Boehm did not
participate.
333 Id. at 327.
334

Id. at 323.

335

Id.

336 Id. at 324 (quoting Town of St. John v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 665 N.E.2d 965 (Ind.
Tax 1996)).
337 Id. at 327.
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As a method or mode of valuation, fair market value (or its substantial
equivalent) would satisfy the Indiana Constitution's requirement of
338
uniformity, equality, and just valuation.
In 1998, the court revisited the meaning of this provision and the
property tax system in State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Town of St.
John. 339 The court reiterated the meaning of Article X, section 1:
[T]he Property Taxation Clause requires the General
Assembly to provide for a system of assessment and
taxation characterized by uniformity, equality, and just
valuation based upon property wealth, but the Clause
does not require absolute and precise exactitude as to
the uniformity and equality of each individual
assessment. The system must also assure that individual
taxpayers have a reasonable opportunity to challenge
whether the system prescribed by statute and
regulations was properly applied to individual
assessments, but the Clause does not create a personal,
substantive right of uniformity and equality. It does not
establish an entitlement to individual assessments for
abstract evaluation of property wealth, nor does it
mandate the consideration of independent property
wealth evidence in individual assessments or tax
appeals. 340
The court ultimately construed the statute establishing the property
tax assessment system so that it could be upheld as constitutional. 341 The
court determined, however, that the cost schedules promulgated by the
Indiana Board of Tax Commissioners lacked meaningful reference to
property wealth, were not grounded on objectively verifiable data,
resulted in significant deviations from substantial uniformity and
equality across property classifications, and thus violated Article X,
3 42
section 1.

338 Id.

339 702 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind. 1998). Justice Dickson wrote for the majority, with Chief Justice
Shepard and Justice Selby concurring. Justice Sullivan concurred and dissented. Justice
Boehm did not participate.
34

Id. at 1040.

341 Id. at 1037-38 (construing IND. CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(c) (2002)).
342 Id. at 1043.
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CONCLUSION

The framers and ratifiers of the 1851 Indiana Constitution conceived
of equality as a fundamental value, and that value pervades the
document that was and is the Indiana Constitution. In its recent
decisions, the Indiana Supreme Court has refocused upon this value,
demonstrating the fundamental nature of equality and the importance of
carefully reviewing governmental action to determine whether this value
is advanced or jeopardized. Then, as now, the government sometimes
acts inconsistently with the value of equality, and in such instances, the
political and legal institutions established by the Indiana Constitution
must stand ready to remedy the wrong and to address the unequal
treatment.
In the modern regulatory state, in which criminal laws, civil statutes,
and regulations touch nearly every aspect of one's private and public
life, the threat of unequal treatment is heightened, not lessened.
Although today the government may less commonly engage in unequal
treatment based upon invidious classifications such as race, gender, or
religion, the government may engage in unequal treatment based upon
non-invidious classifications. In an attempt to limit the liability of
certain persons or entities or to protect or promote certain commercial or
economic interests, the legislature may, sometimes perhaps unwittingly,
arbitrarily create classes of persons or entities to receive benefits or suffer
additional burdens. In an attempt to get tough on crime, to ensure that
certain offenders never victimize again, or to limit judicial discretion, the
legislature may establish a statutory scheme that results in unequal
treatment in the criminal context. Unequal treatment may also manifest
itself in the government's exercise of its general police powers, its
selective enforcement of its laws, or its targeting of disfavored conduct.
Regardless of how laudable the goal or sound the policy basis, an
always present threat remains that the government will adopt a means
that results in unequal treatment. However, the judicial branch alone
does not bear the responsibility of ensuring that the government does
not act in a manner that compromises the value of equality. The political
branches and local governments must also accept their responsibilities to
take steps that promote the value of equality and to ensure that
government treatment of individuals and classes of individuals is evenhanded. As each of these branches assume their responsibilities to
promote and preserve the fundamental value of equality recognized by
the framers and ratifiers of the 1851 Constitution, the citizens of Indiana
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will see that the framers' "old idea" has significant meaning and
important applications in their new and ever-changing world.
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